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Den interne væbnede konflikt på Sri Lanka: En strategisk analyse af Eelam IV krigen 2006-09

Studenteropgave: Master speciale

  • Søren Anker Larsen
MMS, Master i Militære Studier (Masteruddannelse)
The Sri Lankan civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government lasted from 1983 till 2009 and for much of the conflict the LTTE appeared to be invincible. Yet in three short years between 2006 and 2009 the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa defeated the LTTE comprehensively. This thesis suggests that this defeat was brought about by a paradigm shift in the government’s strategic approach to the conflict. Instead of a Peace through Negotiation strategy the SLFP government opted for a Peace through War strategy from 2006 and onwards. Using a grand strategy that combined all of the elements of DIME1 they were able to secure diplomatic support from China in the UN, fend of the international media in order to avoid the CNN effect2, defeat the LTTE through a ruthless military campaign, and secure financing for the war from countries outside the West. Yet while some aspects of the military campaign were unquestionable successes the overall impression of the war was marred by the substantial Tamil civilian casualties in its final phases and the countless cases of human rights abuses against anyone who stood in the government’s way.
SprogDansk
Udgivelsesdato2017
Antal sider60
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