Chapter 6

Structures and Cultures—
Civil-Military Cooperation
in Homeland Security:

The Danish Case

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"This is a warning to all European countries, but first and foremost to Denmark, which still has soldiers in Muslim countries," ran a message posted on the internet and signed by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades in the wake of the terrorist attacks on London, July 7, 2005.[1]

The Abu Hafs Brigades are not believed to have operational capabilities and the group therefore hardly poses a direct threat to European security. The message nevertheless highlighted a politically awkward fact: Surely, keeping a distance from the US is by no means a guarantee against Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism, witness the threats issued against France in 2004 due to its law banning religious symbols including Muslim headscarves in public schools.[2] Yet, being a close ally of the US and maintaining troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan can bring a country unwanted attention from the international Al-Qaeda inspired salafi-jihadist movement or contribute to domestic radicalization.

In a 2004 report the UK's Home Office pointed to the British presence in Iraq as a driver of domestic radicalization—radicalization made plain when home grown terrorist struck the London subway in

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[1] Cited in "Ny terrortrussel fra Al Qaida-gruppe," *Jyllands-Posten*, July 13, 2005, p. 1.

[2] For threats against France, see Roger Cohen, "A French ex-hostage describes his ordeal," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 January, 2005; Alan Riding, "France Reports Threat From an Islamic Group," *New York Times*, 17 March, 2004.

July 2005.[3] In Denmark's case, the engagement in Iraq has sparked more frequent coverage of the Scandinavian country in the Arab media and it has been singled out in extremist warnings on a number of occasions beginning in August 2004. In sum, international engagements might well increase the threat to the homelands of America's European partners.

Foreign and security policy neither should, nor can be adjusted to placate the people who subscribe to Al-Qaeda's world view. Yet, arguably an activist foreign policy like the Danish or British must go hand in hand with a robust, flexible, and coordinated homeland security system. Homeland security is here defined as coordinated efforts to prevent, protect, and respond to terrorism as well as natural or man-made disasters.[4]

The need for enhanced civil-military cooperation to create homeland security is, as elaborated elsewhere in this book, increasingly emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic. This chapter, with a view to extracting lessons of relevance to policy-makers and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic, looks at ongoing Danish efforts in the field.

Civil-military cooperation, it is argued, depends on forging the right structures (joint planning processes; clear distribution of functions and responsibilities; clarity as to chain of command; information sharing; joint exercises and evaluation). However, the chapter points out, effective homeland security also depends on the existence of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation. Otherwise, the friction that arises between differing civilian and military organizational cultures might undermine the best thought out plans and policies. A culture of cross-governmental cooperation, the chapter suggests, could be promoted by more joint education of the leaders of the

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[3] Home Office, "Relations with the Muslim Community," April 6, 2004.

[4] The definition corresponds to the all-hazard approach taken by most European governments. Though the definition of homeland security in the US National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes only terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security is increasingly emphasizing the all-hazard approach as well. For the US definition of homeland security see Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington DC, 2002, p. 2. For the emerging emphasis on all-hazards see Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security," Office of the Press Secretary, July 2005.

involved agencies, since these elites are the key shapers of organizational culture.[5]

The chapter opens with a brief discussion of the structural and cultural requirements for effective and efficient civil-military homeland security cooperation. It proceeds to use the Danish case to illustrate these requirements. It provides an overview over current Danish efforts and discusses the hurdles and obstacles encountered in the process of enhancing civil-military homeland security cooperation in Denmark. Finally, it is pointed out how some of these hurdles might be overcome, and what other countries may learn from the Danish experience.

Structure and Culture: Requirements for Civil-Military Cooperation

The militaries of the transatlantic area have from time to time provided help to national emergency management agencies or rescue services in connection with natural disasters or other emergencies. Thus, military assistance to civilian authorities is not new. Extreme weather conditions as well as accidents and disasters continue to pose challenges, witness the havoc wrought by Hurricane Katrina. However, with the rise of Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism, risks to the homeland have become more unpredictable in terms of their nature and their scope. Engineered disasters, such as multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks or incidents involving CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) materials have become more likely.[6]

The new threat environment raises new questions and poses new challenges to both the civilian and the military side—the military might be required to perform a broader range of tasks to protect the homeland, and both civilian and military actors will have to adjust habits and customs as the military's role expands.

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[5] The chapter is based on a review of key policy documents combined with personal interviews with high ranking representatives from the involved agencies, including the Danish National Police, Danish Defense Command, the Ministry of Defense, the Danish Prime Minister's Office, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The interviews were carried out between June and October 2005.

[6] Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005, p. 1.

A number of Rand studies have pointed to the need for an examination of military doctrine, organization, training, leadership development, and materiel in light of new homeland security tasks. They point out that the military needs to contemplate and plan for multiple tasks such as providing facility security and infrastructure protection (patrolling, protection, air defense systems, expertise as regards protection of IT systems); support to law enforcement (sharing intelligence, training facilities, expertise, specialized equipment, and provide direct support for civil law enforcement); reassurance (presence, patrolling, guard duty); WMD protection (detection, decontamination, evacuation, search and rescue, medical treatment); and consequence management (crowd control, provide utilities, food and shelter, removal of debris, reconstruction).[7]

The US Department of Defense has issued a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, in which it addresses overall questions regarding tasks, priorities, organization, training, and materiel. In turn, NORTHCOM—the US command in charge of defense of the homeland—based on fifteen different threat scenarios has drafted plans for the military's role in homeland security based on fifteen different crisis scenarios. Current planning spans from modest support missions with civil authorities in the lead to major emergency management efforts after a mass-casualty CBN-attack—a scenario in which the military due to the scale and severity of the crisis is foreseen to take the lead. On the European side of the Atlantic, European military research institutes have begun to address some of the same questions.[8]

However, a flexible, coordinated, and cost-effective homeland security effort arguably requires not just the armed forces, but all major actors in homeland security to critically analyze existing structures—plans, functions, responsibilities, processes, chains of command, and channels of information. Moreover, the effort should, at least at the strategic level, be joint, not agency specific.

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[7] Lynn E. Davis, David E. Mosher, Richard R. Brennan, Michael D. Greenberg, K. Scott McMahon, Charles W. Yost, *Army Forces for Homeland Security* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2004); Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), p. 21.

[8] Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005; Bradley Graham, "War Plans Drafted to Counter Terror Attacks in the U.S.," *Washington Post*, 8. August, 2005. For an example of European research, see Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit—Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).

A coordinated and cost-effective effort requires the civilian and the military side to develop a common understanding of what tasks the military should perform or support, what capabilities it should provide, how fast, and for how long. This requires at least rough agreement on the probability of various scenarios and the response capabilities required in each, as well as an overview over the capabilities already available in the civilian system. In other words, national police forces, emergency management agencies, and the armed forces need to develop common planning scenarios and common planning goals.[9]

Common scenarios and planning goals also entail clarifying who is responsible for what. The British experience refined over years of combating IRA terrorism indicates that such clarity is central in order to prevent that bureaucratic turf wars impair and delay the effort. Likewise, the problems that hampered the US response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated the importance of such clarity—gaps between local, state-level and federal planning efforts have been identified as one of the key problems leading to late and insufficient evacuation, rescue, and relief efforts. Thus, the establishment of clear areas of responsibilities should be combined with an overview over all levels of the homeland security system to make sure that important issues do not fall between the cracks in a layered system.[10]

At the operational level mechanisms of coordination, clear lines of authority, and a common situational picture are important to ensure an effective multi-agency response to major incidents. Coordination of the rescue effort in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina, involving federal, state level and local personnel, was hampered by the existence of three parallel chains of command instead of one. Likewise, the September 11th Commission has documented how the rescue effort in the towers of the World Trade Center was hampered by the absence of coordination, unity of command, and a com-

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[9] Lynn E. Davis, "Defining the Army's Homeland Security Needs," in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, *The US Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), p. 66.

[10] "Hurricane Katrina and US homeland security," *IISS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 11 Issue 7, September 2005; Terence Taylor, "United Kingdom" i Yonah Alexander (red.) *Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), s. 197.

mon situational picture. Some floors were searched twice by different services, and according to witnesses, some fire fighters in the World Trade Center's North Tower refused to take evacuation orders from New York Police Department officers after the collapse of the South Tower. Finally, 911 operators, unaware that the South Tower had collapsed, told callers from the North Tower to stay in place and wait for help at points in time when emergency stairwells were still passable.[11] Finally, joint training, exercises, and evaluation are key to identify gaps in the structures as well as to keeping policies and plans updated and operational skills honed.[12]

International coordination and standardization when it comes to forging these structures would, obviously, add further robustness to national systems. It would facilitate the stepping in of partner countries to support a country whose national capabilities are overwhelmed by a catastrophic incident. The EU is cooperating on a number of homeland security areas, as elaborated elsewhere in this volume. Transatlantic homeland security cooperation is also on the rise.[13]

In sum, the past years have seen an increased focus on the need to forge new plans, priorities, structures, and processes in order to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security. Yet, though forging the right structures is important, arguably, it is not sufficient. Culturalist theories of organizational change would emphasize how friction between differing organizational cultures (the values, beliefs, and assumptions shared by the members of an organization) may derail even the best thought out policies and plans. Diverging perceptions of the environment and of the homeland security mission, diverse notions about methods and instruments to be deployed, differ-

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[11] "Hurricane Katrina and US homeland security," *IISS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 11 Issue 7, September 2005; The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC, July 2004), p. 295, 310, 318, 321-322.

[12] United States Government Accountability Office, *Department of Homeland Security. Strategic Management of Training Important for Successful Transformation*, GAO-05-888, p. 1; Daniel R. Walker, *The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force base, Alabama, April 1996, p. 26.

[13] See Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel Hamilton, eds., *Transatlantic Homeland Security. Protecting Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism*, (Routledge, 2006).

ent success criteria, and resulting misunderstandings and mutual distrust are likely to complicate the effort.[14]

Thus, structural reforms do not in themselves ensure cooperation. On the contrary, they might trigger defensive reactions because specific organizational turfs, norms, and procedures are thus challenged.[15] Indeed, it appears, that the break-down of law and order and the slow relief effort in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina was not due to a shortage of personnel—the US was eventually able to muster 70.000 troops, 21 military vessels and 215 aircraft in the region hit by Katrina—but due to a reluctance on part of civilian actors to *request* this help.[16]

The reluctance to deploy troops at home has deep historical roots in many countries and can clearly not be overcome overnight. Yet, a starting point could be to utilize common education, exercises and drills of civilian and military actors to build mutual trust. Common education, exercises, and drills are, as noted above, crucial in honing skills and checking for gaps in planning and coordination mechanisms. But common education and training might also help promote a common understanding of the mission and the goals, promote a common language, common skills, mutual knowledge, and common experiences. Over time such activities might serve to make different cultures converge and to promote a common culture of cross-governmental cooperation.[17]

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[14] On organizational culture and change see Jeff Dooley, Cultural Aspects of Systemic Themanager.org, available on http://www.themanager.org/Knowledgebase/Management/Change.htm (Accessed October 18, 2005). See also Ronald L. Jefferson, Wendt, Alexander, and Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996) "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security Policy," in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, Columbia University Press, 1996. The same argument applies to international cooperation where differing national security cultures may complicate international homeland security cooperation. The problem of diverging threat perceptions in Europe and the US respectively is discussed in depth elsewhere in this volume.

[15] Jeff Dooley, Cultural Aspects of Systemic Themanager.org, available on http://www.themanager.org/Knowledgebase/Management/Change.htm (Accessed October 18, 2005).

[16] US Senate Homeland Security Committee hearings have revealed conflicting perspectives on whether local, state, or federal level authorities are to fault for the failure to request this help in a timely fashion. Spencer S. Hsu, "Repeat of Past Mistakes mars Government's Disaster Response," *Washington Post*, October 16, 2005; Spencer S. Hsu, "Messages Depict Disarray in Federal Katrina Response," *Washington Post*, October 18, 2005; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Office of Public Affairs, FEMA, October 20, 2005.

[17] Daniel R. Walker, *The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force base, Alabama, April 1996, p. 26.

In sum, existing policy studies of civil-military cooperation tend to emphasize the need to adjust military structures in order to create more effective civil-military homeland security cooperation. Yet, arguably it is necessary for all the major actors to jointly adjust their planning, processes, command arrangements, and training. In this process, policymakers pushing for increased civil-military cooperation must pay attention to distinct organizational cultures, which might otherwise undermine the effectiveness of the joint structures. A culture of cross-governmental cooperation should be actively promoted through education and training.

The Danish Case

The Danish efforts to promote civil-military cooperation in the field of homeland security should be of broader interest for three reasons. First, Denmark is a small country, with a tradition for cross-governmental and civil-military cooperation (for example Denmark has no coast guard and thus the navy carries out patrolling, maritime search and rescue, and environmental monitoring. Military special operations forces and police special units also have a long tradition for cooperating when it comes to special high-end tasks), and a relatively pragmatic view on using the armed forces to support civilian authorities in responding to disasters or accidents. Thus, Denmark should be well placed to intensify civil-military cooperation.

Second, and related, the need to ensure optimal use of scarce resources—be they civil or military—is likely to be more keenly felt than in larger countries.

Thirdly, unlike the US, Denmark has not been forced to reform its security system in the wake of a major attack on its soil—a situation not necessarily conducive to well thought through solutions. Instead, reform has been more gradual. Yet, the new experience of being singled out for salafi-jihadist attention adds a measure of urgency to the ongoing efforts and secures counter-terrorism a place near the top of the political agenda. Thus, political pressure might help soften bureaucratic resistance to structural changes that inevitably upsets old turfs, procedures and priorities, or, in other words, challenges organizational culture.

All in all, the Danish case should point to opportunities for other countries, yet, it might also indicate the sticking points, calling for particular political attention if civil-military cooperation is to become effective—if the implementation of a particular aspect of civil-military cooperation is problematic in a Danish context, it is likely to demand a very targeted effort in larger countries with more strict dividing lines between different government agencies.

The Danish homeland security system did receive a shake-up after September 11, 2001. Among the initiatives were new anti-terrorism laws, significantly expanded resources to the two Danish intelligence services, new equipment to the Danish Emergency Management Agency, and a Danish push for reinforced homeland security cooperation in the EU, among others, a proposal to develop a set of EU homeland security headline goals.[18]

As part of the effort to enhance Danish homeland security, civil-military cooperation has been intensified. The Danish Defense Forces Act (2004) established that Danish armed forces have two major tasks: To participate in international crisis management efforts and to support civilian authorities in the provision of homeland security in case of terrorist attacks, disasters or accidents.[19] The major civilian partners in homeland security at the national level are the National Police including the Danish Security Intelligence Service, both reporting to the Minister of Justice, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), originally reporting to the Minister of the Interior.

In an attempt to reduce the number of seams in the system, DEMA was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense as of February 2004. The reorganization, it was hoped, would permit rationalization through common use of support structures, logistics, schools, depots, and infrastructure. By creating a common

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[18] For a fuller account of the reaction to September 11 in the Scandinavian countries see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen "Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective" in Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit—Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).

[19] "Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende en samling af det civile beredskab og forsvarets opgaver," Copenhagen, December 2003; Forsvarsforlig, Ministry of Defense, Copenhagen, 10. June, 2004.

pool of resources, more common education, and common planning, it was also hoped, the system would become more efficient.[20]

Some critics argued that DEMA should instead have been transferred to the Ministry of Justice to avoid a militarization of the system. Opponents of this, however, argued that the functions of DEMA had very little affinity with the functions of the police and would fit more naturally under the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the Minister of Defense, through DEMA, is now responsible for coordinating cross-governmental civilian preparedness and response planning. The police, however, is responsible for operational coordination in case of an incident—natural or man-made—that requires a response from more than one governmental agency (for example police, fire fighters, and health workers).[21]

To expand the pool of personnel available for homeland security needs the education of Danish conscripts has been adjusted to focus on homeland security tasks. Conscripts currently serve four months and their education comprises basic skills such as guard duty, first aid, fire fighting and civil rescue support. Within three years of having completed the education they can be called up to serve in a "total defense force" with homeland security tasks.[22] The Danish Home Guard is likewise available to support homeland security needs. The Home Guard has almost 60,000 members and a tradition for assisting DEMA or the police in connection with disasters or large public events. If requested by the police the Home Guard assists with specific tasks in peacetime such as monitoring and guarding critical facilities, providing sanitary units, and assisting with traffic control.[23] A new Center for Biological Preparedness likewise is based

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[20] Ministry of Defence on behalf of the Government, *Et robust og sikkert samfund. Regeringens politik for beredskabet i Danmark*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 7.

[21] Udvalget for National Sårbarhedsudredning, *National Sårbarhedsudredning*, Birkeroed, 2004, p. 28.

[22] For a fuller account of the role of the new homeland security force see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen "Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective" in Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit—Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).

[23] Statsrevisoratet, 7/03 Beretning om hjemmeværnet, <http://www.ft.dk/BAGGRUND/ statsrev/0703.htm#V> (accessed: 14. October 2004).

on cooperation between civilian medical personnel and the military, which makes transport capability available for the center's bio-hazard teams.

All in all the Danish system has already been revamped to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security and civilian and military agencies already cooperate on a number of tasks. Yet, as elaborated below, there are still shortfalls in the efforts to forge optimal structures—arguably in part due diverging organizational cultures between the major actors involved.

Common Planning Scenarios and Goals

To what extent have the actors in Danish homeland security developed a common threat and risk assessment, and a common understanding of what tasks the military should perform or support, what capabilities it should provide, how fast, and for how long?

At an overall level, representatives from the key agencies involved in homeland security at the national level—the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Command, DEMA, and the National Police—seem to share a common notion of the homeland security mission: a flexible and coordinated effort, drawing on the total resources of the civil and military sector in an effective manner. They also consistently emphasize the willingness to be pragmatic in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to reach that common goal.[24]

On a number of more specific issues, however, they differ. Firstly, threat perceptions diverge. Whereas the military is contemplating a range of events, from small scale to mass-casualty incidents, the police mainly focus on smaller events, where the need for resources would not overwhelm civilian actors.

The police emphasize that military units might assist civilian law-enforcement when it comes to monitoring or searching a large area, providing disaster relief, traffic control etc. Representatives of the police, however, insist that whenever a task entails even a small risk that it will be necessary to use force against civilians, it is a job for the

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[24] Author's interviews, Copenhagen, July 12 and 14, August 17 and 19, 2005.

police, not military units.[25] There is reluctance when it comes to drawing on the typically young members of the total defense force for any tasks that might bring them into direct contact with the population (crowd control and some forms of guard duty). For softer tasks, such as traffic control, monitoring critical infrastructure or searching larger areas, the police prefer to rely on elements of the Home Guard—the so-called police home guard—rather than the total defense force.

Whereas the military emphasizes that situations might arise, in which all organized manpower resources could be needed and should be used across a range of tasks, they refer to the police as the actor, which is requesting and leading the joint effort, and thus should take the lead in developing planning scenarios and task lists. This reticence might reflect that Danish armed forces, in line with their American counterparts, do not wish to signal an intention to usurp the area of homeland security. Another reason, however, might be that whereas the military increasingly takes the homeland security part of its mission seriously, international deployments are still regarded as the core task. As the active component of the Danish military in line with the US military operates with dual-capable and in effect dual-hatted forces, situations with competing demands at home and abroad might arise. This points to the question whether certain assets should be earmarked for homeland security purposes. The US military has, for example, dedicated a command and control element together with a number of National Guard WMD-detection teams for domestic use only.[26]

Thus, the willingness to push for a systematic planning process, which could reveal the need for the military to earmark resources and capabilities for domestic use only, might be limited. The problem in this respect, however, is that the police have less of a tradition of strategic planning (scenario development, simulations and exercises, systematic feed-back from these and subsequent adjustment of plans and policies) than the military side.

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[25] Author's interviews, Copenhagen, July 14, 2005.

[26] Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005, p. 39. A related issue pertains to the planning horizon of different actors in the homeland security system. Whereas domestic situations requiring a manpower surge can arise with little or no warning (accidents, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, political events requiring a high level of security), the military planning horizon is typically longer and does not necessarily permit for the kind of flexibility the police would like to see.

As a result, there is currently no systematic effort to develop a range of common planning scenarios and goals like the ones produced by, for example, NORTHCOM and consequently, there is no clear cross-governmental consensus as to what specific tasks what military units should plan and train for in homeland security and whether certain capabilities should be earmarked for homeland security needs. A joint working group consisting of representatives from the police and the military is currently looking at various coordination issues, chiefly, though, legal and financial aspects of civil-military cooperation.

In sum, whereas the actors in the Danish homeland security system do have a common frame of reference regarding the overall mission—a flexible and coordinated effort drawing on the total resources of the civil and military sector in an effective manner—they have yet to converge on a common threat perception. Common planning scenarios and common planning goals, making explicit what tasks the military should perform and what, if any, capabilities should be earmarked for domestic use only are still to be developed. Developing joint scenarios, including high-end incidents, and planning goals would not only make the Danish system better prepared to handle extreme incidents—a systematic process of imagining, planning for, gaming, exercising and evaluating a range of different scenarios is arguably a key ingredient in creating the flexibility that the major actors themselves identify as a key goal.

Operational Coordination

To what extent are areas of responsibility and lines of authority and operational command and control clear in the Danish system?

The Danish emergency management system is based on the principle of sectoral responsibility. This entails, that the agency, which in normal times have responsibility for a given area maintains responsibility in case of a crisis, disaster or terrorist attack. DEMA is supervising the emergency preparedness plans and procedures of the different agencies. With the aim to create a more coherent emergency planning system a number of cross-governmental coordination groups have been established and DEMA is currently developing uniform guidelines for vulnerability- and risk assessment to be applied across the government.[27]

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[27] Ministry of Defence on behalf of the Government, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, June 2005, p. 4.

The Danish system has three levels, based on the principle that local actors respond first. If an incident exceeds a certain scale, local efforts are supported by resources from the so-called regional preparedness centers. The local chief of police is coordinating multi-agency local crisis management efforts as well as the regional reinforcements. If local and regional resources are overwhelmed by an incident on a national scale or multiple serious incidents in more locations a new National Operative Staff chaired by the National Police Commissioner will be activated to coordinate the effort. The staff is composed of representatives from the National Police, the Defense Command, and DEMA as well as other agencies depending on the nature of specific incidents. The task of the staff is to "establish and maintain an overview" over an incident/incidents in order to "provide the foundation for making decisions about coordination and prioritization" in the management of the incident/incidents.[28]

In terms of lines of authority, the Danish system appears clear and should permit Danish authorities to avoid the problems that hampered for example the US response to Katrina, arising from unclear or parallel lines of command and authority.

The national staff is an important innovation. The system of locally coordinated response reinforced, if necessary, by regional or national resources, works well when it comes to handling the most likely smaller or medium size incidents. Yet, it is not geared to handle a situation where the scale of an incident makes resources scarce; and, thus, requires a central prioritization of national resources between different localities. The national staff has the potential to fill this gap.

Ironically, though, the staff, or in case of internal disagreement, the chairman of the staff, is not given the mandate to decide authoritatively how to prioritize resources in case of more simultaneous incidents and a need that exceeds the available capacity. Some of the involved actors consider such a prospect rather theoretical and believe that should it arise, peer pressure would ensure that the necessary decisions would be taken anyway.[29] Yet, replacing the currently rather

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[28] Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 6.

[29] Author's interviews, Copenhagen, July 14, 2005.

vague mandate with one giving staff/chairman the competence to decide authoritatively if necessary, however, would seem like a very inexpensive way of hedging against losing precious time due to arguments internally in the staff or between the national staff and local or regional actors during a national crisis.

Changing the institutional set-ups, however, is not enough. As pointed out by culturalist theories of organizational change and as illustrated with the establishment of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the mere moving of different agencies into the same Department and giving a Secretary the authority to coordinate their activities does not in itself guarantee cooperation. Different cultures still clash inside the DHS and hamper cooperation.

Moreover, pushing too hard for clear lines of command and control might provoke a backlash complicating rather than facilitating cooperation, at least as long as the actors do not, as discussed above, share a common view of risks, probabilities, and tasks. In other words, leaving delimitation of responsibilities and lines of authority unclear in extreme, but not very likely situations might prevent turf wars and institutional anxieties from erupting. The down side to this, of course, is that the national system, as argued, will not be in optimal shape to handle a truly grave incident.

Education, Exercises, Evaluation

To what extent do the various actors in Danish homeland security train and exercise together and to what extent are the educational programs coordinated and integrated?

As mentioned above, the education of conscripts in the armed forces includes homeland security relevant tasks. DEMA has assisted the Danish Army Command in putting together this part of the new education. Moreover, DEMA officers and officers in the military services attend the same schools for part of their education. Finally, once a year DEMA, the Defence Academy and the National Commissioner organize a five-day seminar for employees of the central ministries, involved with national emergency management planning. The focus is

on national security and defense policy, national emergency planning, and crisis management.[30]

During the years between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, there was little focus on exercising the national level of the Danish emergency and crisis management system. After September 11th Denmark has had two tabletop exercises, one in November 2003 and one in November 2005.[31] The 2003 exercise highlighted problems in terms of willingness and ability on part of the central actors in the national crisis management system to share knowledge and exchange classified information. It also pointed to the need for more cross-governmental coordination of communication with the press and information to the public.[32] The 2005 exercise will provide a benchmark as to whether these shortfalls have been addressed.

Tabletop exercises that cut across more government agencies and levels are crucial, particularly at times where an existing system is undergoing reform. Simulations and exercises can help identify potential seams and gaps before an emergency situation makes them apparent. Simulations and exercises also help expose potential dilemmas, giving decision makers a chance to contemplate them at more leisure than during a real incident, and thus, hopefully, help promote better thought through decisions. An intensification of this activity would appear a worthwhile investment to improve the Danish homeland security system. Moreover, live exercises, activating all levels of the homeland security system and actors from the major different agencies involved would be desirable.[33]

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[30] Direktiv for kursus for centrale beredskabsmyndigheder, Beredskabsstyrelsen, available on http://www.brs.dk/fagomraade/tilsyn/udd/Uddannelseskatalog/direktiv_kurser/ledelse_og _organisation/landsdaekkende_totalforsvarskursus/frame.htm (Accessed on October 17, 2005); Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 12.

[31] Danish officials from the national level of Denmark's crisis management system (National Police, Police Security Intelligence Service, Ministry of Defense, Defense Command, Emergency Management Agency) also participate in the yearly NATO tabletop Crisis Management Exercise (CMX).

[32] Øvelsesledelsen, *Samlet evalueringsrapport. Krisestyringsøvelse 2003 (KRISØV 2003)*, January 2004, available on http://www.brs.dk/info/rapport/kriseoevelse2003/evauleringsrapport. pdf (Accessed October 19, 2005).

[33] Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 11.

To facilitate cross-governmental evaluation a committee—the so-called Kontaktudvalg—composed of representatives from the major actors in the emergency preparedness system has been established. The Kontaktudvalg can charge ad-hoc groups to evaluate specific incident management operations.[34] Arguably, however, systematic evaluation should be carried out by an independent committee specializing in the task instead of members of he evaluated agencies themselves.

A Culture of Cross-Governmental Cooperation

The discussion above shows, that there are remaining gaps in the structures of the emerging Danish system for civil-military cooperation in homeland security. Common planning scenarios and goals,[35] a national staff with the mandate to make tough decisions if necessary, live national exercises, and an independent evaluation system are still lacking. Yet, on other important issues, the structures appear in good shape: Areas of responsibility and lines of authority are clear when it comes to handling small and medium sized incidents—the creation of a national staff indicates at least an awareness of the existence of a gap when it comes to handling large-scale incidents; education and training is integrated to a remarkable extent; operational coordination between different agencies in local incident management seems to function seamlessly.

The relative good shape of the structures of civil-military homeland security cooperation could be seen as an expression of a high level of political attention given to the area over the past couple of years, resulting in pressure on the involved agencies to coordinate their efforts. Political decisions have begun to create some structures that put a premium on cooperation. But also, the Danish tradition for cross-governmental cooperation arguably also means, that a culture of cross-governmental cooperation already exists, as evident in, for

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[34] Ibid. p. 13.

[35] The actors in Denmark's homeland security system, for example, have not jointly addressed some of the most grave possible scenarios—in what circumstances would a crisis be so grave that the military, not the civilian side would take the lead? What happens if the national headquarters disappear? Though such scenarios might seem remote, it would make good sense to at leas discuss them in order to hedge against being wholly unprepared in case of a catastrophic event.

example, the common definition of the homeland security mission proposed by representatives of all the major agencies interviewed for this chapter. Arguably, this culture has provided a firm foundation on which current efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation could build.

The Danish reform process has seen examples of cultural clashes and defensive reactions, particularly in the discussion over the National Operative Staff, resulting in a rather weak and vague mandate. Cultural differences are also evident when looking at threat perceptions and planning processes. Whereas civilian actors have been frustrated with what they perceive as an exaggerated military focus on high consequence-low probability scenarios, military actors have been frustrated with a perceived almost exclusive civilian focus on low consequence-high probability scenarios.[36]

Nevertheless, these differences have been contained. The squabbles have not derailed overall progress in enhancing civil-military cooperation in homeland security, neither do they appear to have had any negative impact on operational and practical cooperation.

Arguably, an active attempt at strengthening the existing culture of cross-governmental cooperation is key to further progress when it comes to fixing the remaining gaps in the Danish system. Historical experience indicates that it frequently takes major disasters to significantly alter threat perceptions, worldviews, and organizational cultures and habits. Yet, common education and common exercises might incrementally cause different perceptions to converge.[37]

Education of the various actors in Denmark's homeland security is already to a significant extent integrated—a factor that probably is contributing to the high level of trust between operational personnel from different authorities. Yet, in order to make the threat perceptions and different cultures converge at the central level, common education of leaders about strategic issues, with an eye to further a common understanding of threats, probabilities, priorities, and tasks could be stepped up. The current five day "Totalforsvars kursus" could be

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[36] Author's interviews, Copenhagen, July 12 and 14, August 17 and 19, 2005.

[37] United States Government Accountability Office, *Department of Homeland Security. Strategic Management of Training Important for Successful Transformation*, GAO-05-888, p. 1.

expanded to a longer course with a yearly update, obligatory for key administrative and operational leaders. More frequent gaming and live exercises should further the convergence of perspectives as well.

This, in turn, would not only facilitate the task of developing common planning goals, but might also with time make all the involved actors comfortable with a national operative staff with real power, by making the actors confident that they see the problem, the tasks, and the objectives in a more or less similar manner.

In sum, culture impacts the extent to which common structures are accepted and common plans effective. Structures that compel different agencies to work together, in turn, are likely to impact culture over time and lead to a strengthening of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation. The limited scope of this case study does not permit for strong generalizations, but the Danish case indicates, that decision makers and agency leaders seeking to promote civil-military homeland security cooperation need to pay attention to both structures and culture—in particular the latter appears to have been neglected in the studies and actual policies in the area of civil-military homeland security cooperation of recent years.

Conclusion: International Implications of the Danish Experience

The new security environment is characterized by a higher level of uncertainty. A number of high consequence and low or uncertain probability threats to homelands on both sides of the Atlantic have emerged. Creating standing new civilian capabilities to deal with all high consequence-low probability threats would be prohibitively expensive. This has given rise to new demands for civil-military cooperation and for a military contribution to provide homeland security on both sides of the Atlantic.

Denmark has been particularly well placed to push for such cooperation, leveraging off from a tradition of civil-military cooperation and with a good deal of political pressure on the involved agencies to coordinate their efforts. The result is, with some remaining gaps, a system characterized by a high level of integration and coordination when it comes to education, training, and practical operational cooperation.

The Danish case indicates the importance of paying attention to both structure and culture in the effort to enhance civil-military homeland security cooperation. Proclamations of political intent and re-organization of governmental structures do not suffice. Even in a Danish context, where the tradition for cross-governmental cooperation is strong, where the military has long carried out or supported a variety of tasks at home, and where political pressure for a coordinated civil-military efforts is high, turf considerations and differences between the cultures of civilian and military agencies have made for a number of complications, particularly in regard to forging new structures for national crisis management and with regard to systematic strategic homeland security planning.

Civil and military threat perceptions and priorities are likely to diverge even more in most other countries. A targeted effort to make them converge through joint strategic level education and common exercising should thus be an imminent concern in order to ensure that new structures for civil-military cooperation do not give a false sense of security, but actually contribute to a robust and flexible protection of US and European homelands. In a world, where the boundary between internal and external security can no longer be upheld, and where a high international profile is likely to increase the risk to the homeland, such a system is not just key to domestic safety and security, but also to the ability to stay engaged in stabilization and reconstruction missions abroad.