This report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Report and policy recommendations based on the seminar: “Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond” organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016.
IGNITING PATHS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

By David Vestenskov, Consultant
Institute for Military Operations

Royal Danish Defence College
2017
Conference Proceedings No 3 (b) 2017
Seminar: Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond

IGNITING PATHS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

David Vestenskov, Consultant, Institute for Military Operations

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Copenhagen, April 2017
Royal Danish Defence College
Ryvangs Allé 1
DK-2100 Copenhagen
Phone: +45 728 17000
Editor in Chief: Jens Ringsmose, Director
Institute for Military Operations, RDDC
Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls A/S
Layout: Royal Danish Defence College
ISBN: 978-87-7147-186-1
Number printed: 300

This publication can be downloaded for free from www.rddc.dk
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Introduction

In 2016 and beyond, the long conflict-ridden region of South Asia continues to face ever growing challenges, especially so the countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, regional as well as international actors have been forced to adapt and develop new strategies to face the rising threat. Yet the two aforementioned countries’ geographical contiguity, along with a centuries–old common civilization, comprising deeply rooted cultural and historical ties, may serve as stepping stone for building viable strategies for the future.

To attain to the benefits of mutual trust building and collaboration, an important barrier to overcome is the present low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For this reason, a pre-seminar focusing on Mutual Trust building will precede the International Seminar “Carving out a Vision for a brighter Tomorrow”, which employs a broader Quadrilateral regional framework and will take place in Islamabad in February 2017. The Mutual Trust Building seminar sessions will therefore be designed to draw out Afghan and Pakistani perceptions of their relationship and internal challenges in order to find and establish mutual security interests on which to build future cooperation and collaboration. Furthermore, bringing forth the Afghan and Pakistani perceptions of their internal stability challenges and opportunities can decrease the risk of potential misunderstandings concerning the other actor’s goals and motivations in addressing these issues. Increased mutual trust will also serve to facilitate a forum in which the actors can assess and share lessons learned from internal military operations and capacity building.

In an effort toward reconciliation through trust building, and as part of Danish Stabilization Program, RDDC hosted a two-day mutual trust building international seminar in Copenhagen titled: Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond. The Peace and Stabilization Fund (PSF), located at the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Joint Danish Defence Command, provided the financial resources for the seminar and the dialogues in Copenhagen. In order to facilitate regional dialogue, and thereby promote stability in the Central Asian Region, RDDC would like to extend a special vote of thanks to the PSF. Likewise, a special vote of thanks was also given to the Danish Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad for their assistance in coordinating logistics and providing advice in connection with bringing the delegation from Afghanistan and representatives from Pakistan to the seminar. Finally, the assistance by Andreas Høj Fierro and Christian Høj Hansen during the seminar, as well as the assistance in writing the report at hand, is highly appreciated by the lead author as well as by RDDC in general.
The report is composed by an initial executive summary, which gives emphasis to the recommendations that have been derived from the seminar along with a table providing the main points in relation to identifying obstacles and areas of common ground made by each speaker. The subsequent chapters are organized in accordance with the conference program, with each session being concluded with reflective remarks on the key points given during the discussions in the interactive sessions.

It is important to stress that the seminar faced a challenge in terms of balance, as only three Pakistanis were present during the program while the Afghan delegation consisted of ten individuals from different institutions in Afghanistan. However, in this regard, this seminar was in line with other seminars and conferences in that the PSF frame was based on a track II diplomatic foundation, which entails that participants do not represent a state nor are they bound by any official policies. The core focus behind inviting participants is their individual perception of the subject at hand in order to promote innovation and establish an environment where ideas, considerations, and criticism can be floated without political constraints and mandate-driven statements.

The seminar succeeded in bringing forth perceptions of immediate obstacles to cooperation, along with an identification of common ground for moving forward, which should receive greater political attention in the near future. The following report summarizes this based on the research presented during the seminar and subsequent reflections by the speakers as well as the editor. It is the intention and hope that policy makers and officials will make use of these recommendations when developing future policies – be that in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the Western international community in general.
Executive Summary

In October 2016, the Royal Danish Defence College hosted an international seminar titled: “Mutual Trust Building in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond”. The seminar’s intensive two-day program brought forth various interesting opportunities and challenges to the Afghan-Pakistani relationship, which were addressed by both Afghan, Pakistani, and Danish speakers.

The seminar took place at a challenging time for Afghan-Pakistani relations because both countries face several issues due to Pakistan’s major military operation, Zarb-E-Azb in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, which has created spillover effects into Afghanistan. In addition, Afghanistan’s increasing cooperation with India has also challenged the relationship since Pakistan perceives India’s increased influence in Afghanistan as a direct threat.

The seminar report includes perspectives by the speakers and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that tries to identify present challenges and opportunities. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report primarily seeks to address initiatives and processes that successfully can be used to enhance the level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Secondarily, the report also addresses the increasing instability in Afghanistan in the wake of more than 15 years of international military engagement in order to recommend specific measures that could be applied to change the negative spiral in the country’s security situation.

Key Findings of the Seminar on Mutual Trust Building in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond

Tables 1-4 provide an overview of areas of common ground and obstacles identified in each of the seminar’s 4 sessions. The methodological approach behind the tables is qualitative and derived from the presentations in order to provide key points and possible common denominators when seeking common ground for mutual trust building or perspectives on obstacles preventing stronger cooperation. In conclusion, the section briefly summarizes these key findings.

It is important to keep in mind that the findings are based on a disproportionate number of speakers representing twice as many Afghans as Pakistanis, leading to a possible bias in our findings. For an elaborate explanation of the findings, please read the speakers’ separate contributions in the report.
**Table 1: An Assessment of Security Dynamics in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Beyond**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Ground</th>
<th>Obstacles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Ms. Freshta Sakhi** | - Improved border security through joint Afghan-Pakistani military operations  
- Combating drug trafficking in coordination, which would reduce the economic base for the insurgent groups |
| **Mr. Athar Javeed** | - Low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to Pakistan’s military operation Zarb-E-Azb, which has pushed militants onto the Afghan side of the border  
- Media War: Both countries continue to blame each other for the negative development in the security situation |
| **Mr. Mikkel Storm Jensen** | - A third party (NATO) intervention and continued presence in Afghanistan, because this will reduce the possibilities for other regional actors to engage in a detrimental manner  
- Lack of bilateral talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan  
- Lack of unity and independency in the Afghan government in Kabul, which paralyzes the process of sustainable political reform  
- India’s increased activity in the Baluchistan region, which impacts security in the border areas of Baluchistan negatively |
| - Combating drug trafficking at the border areas in coordination  
- Improved border management by increasing the amount of passport controls and checkpoints  
- Cooperation agreements in relation to Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan  
- Strengthened regional economic cooperation in relation to the CPEC agreement, which would promote export possibilities for Afghanistan |
| - A more détente-like relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would make for an incentive for international donors to engage economically in the region  
- A more sustainable approach to border management, which can be implemented through agreements on which specific groups and individuals that both countries should target in their military operations |
| - International donors falling engagement in Afghanistan, which will reduce the prospect for stability and growth  
- The possibility of a breakdown of the Afghan Central Government in Kabul, which reduces the possibilities for regional states to engage in sustainable political cooperation with Afghanistan |
### Table 2: Challenges and Opportunities to Internal Stability: Capacities and Internal Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Ground</th>
<th>Obstacles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. Halimullah Kousary</strong></td>
<td>- Afghanistan’s mountainous geography serve as an advantage to Taliban and other anti-government groups fighting the Afghan state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide better equipment for the Afghan National Army (ANA), which would improve the possibilities for ANA to act in relation to military operations, which again would increase stability in the country and generate support from the civilian population</td>
<td>- Lack of sufficient Afghan security forces: Taliban’s new strategy has resulted in several internal security challenges as the ANA has been forced to fight the Taliban on multiple fronts, which has indicated that the size of the security forces is insufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pakistan should as a regional stakeholder increase their military aid to Afghanistan in order to make ANA capable of combating Taliban and other transnational actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Mr. Adeel Khan**                                                            | - Internal challenges in Pakistan, which also are affecting the internal stability in Afghanistan |
| - Promote an understanding of socioeconomic security in Pakistan              | - Pakistan’s external relations with India reduces Afghanistan’s possibilities for making peace, generating growth, and empowerment |
| - Cooperate on providing jobs: Lack of jobs and education in both countries increases lack of security and anti-government movements, which creates a spillover effect to the security situation in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan |                                                                           |
| - Promote Internal security in both countries by cooperating and coordinating security efforts, as this will have a positive effect in both countries |                                                                           |

| **Mr. Hans Lundsgaard**                                                       | - Lack of trust and cooperation between the ANSF and the Afghan population, especially in the border areas |
| - Promote Stability through better security in Afghanistan by improving trust and capacity building of the Afghan military forces. A stable Afghanistan will have a positive effect on Pakistan | - Lack of educational competencies in the ANSF |
| - Improve the forces’ possibilities to act and engage in military operations |                                                                           |
| - Improve ANA leadership education                                             |                                                                           |
Table 3: Promoting Mutual Trust Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Ground</th>
<th>Obstacles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sayed Madhi Munadi</td>
<td>- Economic cooperation, which can improve the security in the region&lt;br&gt;- Cultural similarities, which are important to underline so that people know their cultural connection&lt;br&gt;- Coordinated Afghan and Pakistani resource initiatives that could improve the populations’ access to resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jakob Brink Rasmussen</td>
<td>- Prevent war and conflicts from escalating by analyzing possible opportune time of intervention&lt;br&gt;- Improve the military forces in both countries by promoting protection of civilians, gender perspectives, rule of law, and security sector reforms in order to generate sustainable civilian support&lt;br&gt;- Earlier military engagement than kinetic operations, which entails that military planners in both countries extend and develop competencies beyond war fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Naheed Farid</td>
<td>- Cooperate on stabilizing Afghanistan in order to keep the amount of Afghan refugees from increasing&lt;br&gt;- Economic projects that focus on improving the living conditions for civilians in Afghanistan, which again would reduce refugee numbers in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Mona Kanwal Sheikh</td>
<td>- The drone strikes have increased the support for Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the urban areas. This mean that TTP today pose an even bigger challenge for the Pakistani Government, which also has created a spillover effect to the security situation in Afghanistan, and countering TTP by kinetic and other means would benefit both countries&lt;br&gt;- Understanding the role of religion in the Taliban movement in order to improve possibilities for initiating peace talks with the Taliban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Igniting Paths of Reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan

### Table 4

**“Regional Stability & Peacebuilding Initiating Reconciliation Between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Ground</th>
<th>Obstacles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mr. William Maley | - The growing Pakistani dependence on Chinese financial investments in Pakistan should be recognized by the West as a whole, as it contains opportunities for diplomatic influence as well as improving trade relations with and among the regional states in general.  
- Coordinated effort on countering specific militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan could pave way for enhanced cooperation and public support in both countries. |
| | - Internal politics are infected by leaders with short-term priorities and a self-imposed pedantic ability to direct all attention to one major security issue without a view to the greater regional setting, and without a vision for long-term development of stability, which would be in the interest of all regional states of South Asia.  
- The role of the Taliban. Bringing the movement into political negotiations could impact the internal stability in Afghanistan negatively as the organizational structure of the movement is very fragile. |
| Mr. Yunas Samad | - Western engagement in the region should focus on nurturing the economic and cultural interdependence between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.  
- A judicious combination of soft and hard power should be directed at increasing trade, investments, and especially developing regional interdependence.  
- Track II diplomacy and people-to-people contact should be supported and expanded as this could be used to generate innovation and internal impetus among the populations for a greater interdependence and thereby also better political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. |
| | - More players have been involved in the region, which have created a heady mix of competing powers, which can make any prognosis for stability challenging.  
- Practitioners and policy-makers have a more intimate and detailed understanding of the various aspects related to regional development, which can make it difficult for other people to understand the development in South Asia.  
- The Taliban movement will continue to test the central Afghan government in Kabul. |
| Mr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen | - International engagement is declining and regional actors need to engage in cooperation on Afghanistan as instability in the country creates negative spill-over effects to all states in the region.  
- Continued international engagement and foreign investments depend on the actions of the Afghan government and progress in stabilization efforts in the region. |
| | - The United States will not be able to provide the progress that will legitimate continued military engagement.  
- A change in Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese security politics toward playing a game-changing progressive role regarding the situation in Afghanistan seems a very low likelihood. So far, none of the countries has seemed eager to take on such role during the past decade and a half. |
Ms. Annemarie Peen Rodt

- The example of the European Union can be used as an inspiration for all regional states in relation to growing economies. Better standards of living will prevent conflicts from arising, as conflict simply will impact the economy of a possible aggressor too much.
- Transformation of protracted conflicts into cooperation is possible if a step-by-step approach is used and short-term objectives can be agreed upon.
- The peacebuilding process should gradually be expanded to involve more parties and states. If an initial bilateral or trilateral cooperation is beneficial in terms of e.g. trade and security, it will generate attraction and have a pull effect on the states that initially were not willing to engage in cooperation.

- Internal pushback and external conflicts are likely to evolve, if the regional actors do not alter their preparation and patience, along with displaying a firm commitment to the long-term project of regional reconciliation.

**Shared Key Findings for Common Ground across Nationalities**

The tables show that three areas of common ground for trust building between Afghanistan and Pakistan stand out as highly important:

1. Improved border security
2. Economic initiatives and cooperation
3. The huge number of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan

One of the areas that can serve as an incentive for finding common purpose was border security, which was highlighted through five of the presentations during the seminar. The presentations stated that improved security in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan is required if the trust level between the two countries is to be improved. Many of the border disputes are related to the huge amount of drugs and weapons being trafficked, which has created an environment in which criminals and insurgents operate with relative ease. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have an interest in combatting the criminals in this area, which calls for a stronger coordination and even joint operations on both sides of the border.

In order to reach a point where joint operations can take place, however, it is essential that Afghanistan improve the educational level of its soldiers. Improving the soldiers’ competencies will also create a better foundation for the Afghan National Army and
the Afghan National Security Forces to engage in populated areas in the border region. Rule of law and interaction with civilians has to be part of the education, as this will improve the level of trust, cooperation, and support from the Afghan population.

Taking all these perspectives into account could pave the way for stronger Afghan-Pakistani cooperation on military operations, create a more symmetrical relationship between the countries, and in the long term decrease Afghan dependency on the West and replace this dependency with greater cooperation with regional states such as Pakistan. A tool in this strategy could be a joint identification of terrorist and insurgency groups to be targeted through coordinated efforts.

Another important area of common ground were economic projects, which were highlighted by four of the speakers. According to the presentations, economic projects should be given a higher focus because the populations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a huge desire for resource initiatives that could improve the populations’ access to resources. Furthermore, economic cooperation could also generate jobs and encourage more investments on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. However, in order to implement economic cooperation successfully, it is important that projects promote socioeconomic security, which means that they should aim to improve infrastructure, the educational system, the health care systems, and the general every-day security for the civilian populations.

Furthermore, people-to-people contact across the border should also be a key priority in order to promote investment opportunities and provide a sustainable framework for this interaction in a long-term perspective. Some of the economic projects that should receive this attention in the near future are the TAPI Pipeline, the CASA-1000 project, the CPEC agreement, and the bilateral trade agreement APTTA.

A third issue highlighted was the huge number of Afghan refugees that are flowing to all of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. Pakistan has since 1980 received more than five million Afghan refugees, which has had a massive impact on Pakistan’s economy. The Afghan refugees have therefore created a strong incentive for all involved actors in the region to cooperate on stabilizing Afghanistan in order to keep the number of Afghan refugees from increasing and to provide existing ones with a secure Afghanistan to which they can return. The two countries could initially start with a plan for creating environments in Afghanistan where repatriation of the refugees is possible and even desirable. This would reinvigorate a sense of dignity among the natives of Afghanistan, and create a positive component of resettlement, which would promote general stability in the region.
**Internal and External Obstacles for Promoting Mutual Trust Building**

The obstacles preventing trust building require a few remarks. The findings at the seminar lack consistency among speakers from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan speakers often saw the challenges to mutual trust building as part of a larger regional issue on which Afghanistan could do nothing, or at best very little, to overcome on its own, as security challenges mainly result from transnational actors’ actions and spill-over effects into Afghan territory. In contrast, the Danish and Pakistani speakers pointed to issues that could in fact be addressed internally such as bad governance (corruption) and lack of an independent and autonomous Afghan government. One Pakistani speaker, Mr. Athar Javeed, highlighted that before Pakistan and Afghanistan meaningfully could engage in trust building it would have to be without a third party dependency as is the case now with the Afghan-NATO relation. However, the Afghan speakers did not share the view that less international engagement in Afghanistan would prove useful. For instance, Mr. Hamimullah Kousary recommended that increased military aid and capacity building for the Afghan National Security Forces would benefit Afghanistan’s future possibilities for engaging in cooperation in the region. In relation to this, Major Mikkel Storm Jensen remarked critically on the Afghan government’s lack of governance and failure to deal with corruption. Hence, as Tables 1-4 show, it is an obstacle for mutual trust building at present, and if the Afghan government does not address this internal challenge sufficiently, it will continue to prevent cooperation with other regional states and in the worst-case scenario lead to an actual breakdown of the Kabul-based central government. On the other side of the border, Pakistan too faces several similar internal challenges, as described by Professor Adeel Khan, which also have a negative influence on Pakistan’s ability to engage in mutual trust building with Afghanistan and beyond.

Future seminars and projects in the framework of the Danish Stabilization Fund, and for that matter in other international program frameworks, could benefit qualitatively by using this report’s findings on common ground and obstacles in order to identify an adequate starting point.

Despite not agreeing on the nature of all security related problems in the region and whether they are internally or externally driven, the seminar proved that cooperation in various areas of common ground easily can indeed be identified, which is a positive reminder that bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan can be improved.

**Key Policy Recommendations**

- Introduce initiatives that can be used to support joint military operations
- Educate military forces in conducting non-kinetic operations to prevent conflicts from escalating
Igniting Paths of Reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan

- Develop joint Afghan-Pakistani institutions that can
  - coordinate the war against drugs and smuggling in the border areas between the countries
  - agree on specific groups and individuals that should be jointly targeted by both countries
- Facilitate economic cooperation at a bilateral level between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which can improve the security situation and living conditions for people in both countries
- The International Community's engagement in Afghanistan should to a higher degree focus on strengthening the quality of military forces in relation to their training and equipment rather than expanding force numbers
- Launch initiatives that can examine whether the International Community's engagement in Afghanistan plays a negative role for the bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Opening Session

Dean Ole Kværnø, RDDC

Dean Ole Kværnø opened the seminar by thanking all the participants for their presence at and contribution to the seminar. The presentation emphasized the Royal Danish Defence College’s continuous engagement in trust building projects during the past three years. A key objective in all projects has been to ensure that interaction among participants at the seminars presents opportunities to widen participants’ individual perspectives on areas of conflict through counter perspectives from an opponent, or even an enemy. A brief vote of thanks was directed to the Danish Stabilization programme for trust building and track II diplomacy, which the seminar was a part of. Overall, these efforts aim at identifying areas of common ground and creating a forum for people-to-people contact below the political decision-making level in order to influence the decision-making level in a bottom-up approach.

Dean Ole Kværnø stated that the seminar is part of an ongoing cooperation between representatives from both Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Denmark. Further, it was highlighted that the original seminar was designated to take place in Islamabad but unfortunately, the seminar had to be postponed until the beginning of 2017, when the Afghan and Pakistani participants present in Copenhagen also would be invited to participate.

The objective for this seminar would - in line with other seminars - be to identify common ground, and not common conflicts, and all the participants were therefore asked to engage in the seminar with an open mind and in a constructive spirit.

Dean Kværnø then assessed the seminar from a Danish point of view. The seminar is of course, related to the previous ISAF mission and the present Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which both had Danish contributions, making the engagement in Afghanistan the largest and longest military contribution in recent Danish history. It was stated that bringing forth the Afghan, Pakistani, and Danish perceptions on challenges and opportunities would help to improve the cooperation between the international community and the region. Furthermore, it serves to facilitate a forum in which all involved actors can share lessons learned about security dynamics, perceptions of military operations and capacity building, and perceptions of mutual trust building.

Lastly, Dean Kværnø noted that disagreements were to be expected, and it is therefore important that all of the participants express their viewpoints, as the understanding of these disagreements is necessary in order to move in a direction of stabilization. However, it was pointed out that this needs to be carried out in a constructive manner.
in order to increase the chances of a fruitful dialogue that subsequently can influence the political echelons in both countries. As a final remark, Dean Kværnø extended his personal thanks to the two Pakistani Scholars, Director Athar Muhammad Javed and Professor Adeel Khan, who constituted the Pakistani contribution to the seminar while the Afghan delegation participated with officials and with a delegation of ten individuals.

**Deputy Director General Mirwais Balkhi, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Director Mirwais Balkhi began by thanking all of the participants for engaging in the seminar and for their contribution to the objective of promoting mutual trust and reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Director Balkhi gave a vote of thanks to the RDDC for their contribution to the seminar and the Stabilization Programme in general, which he highlighted as a beneficial initiative to the process of peace building and regional stability in Central and South Asia.

Director Mirwais Balkhi was very clear on a vital prerequisite for mutual trust building, which is that talks need to be conducted in a pragmatic and realistic manner. Only then will it be possible to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and identify the trust building mechanisms that can create common ground between the two parties and help expedite the process of identifying areas of common ground and obstacles in the present security situation.

It was highlighted that trust is the primary factor that needs to be established in order for people to live peacefully together. On that account, it should be remembered that despite the conflicts people in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan have a strong desire for living peacefully together in secured areas, which means that there is a foundation from which trust and reconciliation can evolve.

Finally, it was noted that the evolvement of mutual trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan will not take place through mutual recriminations. On the contrary, both countries need to listen to each other’s perspectives with an open mind. In conclusion, Mr. Balkhi stated that both nations are challenged with huge internal problems in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan and increased stability would benefit both countries, which left him with optimism about the seminar and its output.
Session 1 - An Assessment of Security Dynamics in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Beyond

Professor Freshta Sakhi: Afghanistan’s Perspective on Current Security Challenges in the Sub-Region

Professor Freshta Sakhi’s presentation emphasized the various security challenges in the Central Asian Sub-Region from an Afghan perspective. She identified five regional issues that the region should focus on solving. In the presentation it was argued that steps by the Afghan side had been taken, exemplified by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s initial outreach to Pakistan, but that these steps have yet to be reciprocated by the Pakistani side.

The following five regional security issues were, from an Afghan perspective, key challenges that should be addressed by the regional states in cooperation:

1. Spillover effects of Zarb-E-Azb
2. Border disputes and challenges
3. Drug trafficking
4. Water issues
5. Dealing with terrorism

The first issue deals with the present security situation in Afghanistan that has been highly challenged by the spillover effects of Pakistan’s military operation Zarb-E-Azb, which was directed at the Pakistani Government regaining control of the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The substantial gains made by the Pakistani Army in FATA have pushed militants onto the Afghan side of the border, in particular in the Kunduz region, putting pressure on the security situation in Afghanistan. This issue remains to be addressed by both Afghan and Pakistani politicians.

The second issue is the security threat stemming from the general border disputes and challenges along the 2,400-kilometer Afghan-Pakistani border. The Afghan government has submitted more than a hundred complaints to Pakistan due to firing and shelling across the border and because of the establishment of Pakistani military installations along the border without any coordination with the Afghan government. The border disputes have cost the lives of border guards and strained the Afghan-Pakistani relationship.
The third issue of drug trafficking is regional and creates a diverse set of challenges for all the region’s governments, such as:

- Funding for terrorism
- Economic base for organized crime
- Fueling the informal economy that damages states’ legitimate economies
- Rise in HIV/AIDS due to an increasing number of drug addicts

The drug trafficking’s regional characteristics can be seen in the production of heroin. While the cultivation and production is undertaken in Afghanistan, the vital necessary chemicals come from Pakistan.

The fourth issue is water security. From an Afghan perspective, large amounts of water currently run freely from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan only uses 30% of its water resources, the rest flows freely to the other neighboring countries.

The fifth issue is dealing with terrorism through a regional effort. A regional approach is necessary as attacks carried out in Afghanistan today often are planned externally. A recent example of this was the externally planned attack on the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul August 2016, which killed 13 and injured 30.

All five issues have to be addressed in a regional frame and the way ahead is for states in the region to engage in mutual trust building in order to initiate a joint process of addressing the issues in a sustainable manner. Steps in this direction have been taken by Afghanistan’s President Ghani, who has already invested a lot of capital in establishing talks with Pakistan, by meeting with leading actors in Pakistan and sending Afghan military cadets to Pakistan.

An important obstacle that has to be overcome is the Media War, in which each country blames the other for the current situation, a process that is only serving to decrease the level of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Addressing issues related to drug trafficking could be used as an initial platform of common purpose. All state actors have a mutual interest and strong incentive to cooperate on this issue, as it has had and will continue to have many negative effects in its slipstream if it continues to go unchecked.

**Mr. Muhammad Athar Javed: “Doing More Together”: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond**

*Mr. Athar Javed’s presentation revolved around the almost non-existing bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The two countries used to be closer, but since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989), and the post-civil war period,*
a state of mistrust has prevailed. Several areas of common ground were identified, such as border security, economic cooperation, and drug trafficking, which are areas where both governments could gain substantially from cooperating. However, before such agreements can be made Afghanistan must have an independent foreign policy, capable of acting without regional, especially Indian, and Western influence because it is crucial to sustain the good work that has been done by NATO and other international development agencies. Demonstrating an all-inclusive foreign policy will help securing sustainable political agreements with Pakistan and the international community.

Initially, it was emphasized how difficult it is to regain the proper level of trust, as both internal dynamics in Afghanistan and external factors cause delays in conflict-resolution. It is important to remember that Pakistan and Afghanistan are neighbors and the bilateral relations between the two countries need to improve in order to initiate a process of regional stability. Today Pakistan and Afghanistan do not have any significant bilateral relations. Like in ongoing and previous conflicts, one witnesses the third party departure in the middle of the conflict. It is highly unlikely that the US would stay longer than necessary in Afghanistan, but the continued temporary presence render it difficult to shape independent approaches towards geopolitical and border issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, due to the permanency of its geographical location, Pakistan will remain an indefinite stakeholder in regional peace and stability. The latter need to receive a stronger political focus, thereby supporting Pakistan’s developmental and peace building policies.

Mr. Javed provided an analysis about underlying factors that demonstrated that Pakistan’s political objective towards its western neighbor is to support an all-inclusive peace, which should be Afghan based and Afghan led. On the question of people-to-people contact, Pakistan has been host to around 5 million Afghan refugees since 1980, whom have been treated with dignity and respect. The respectful return of Afghan refugees would also reinvigorate a sense of dignity among the natives of Afghanistan, a positive component of resettlement and regional stability.

The road to normalizing relations is to create a new discourse based on mutual trust and realities on the ground. Economic cooperation is a solid base for promoting mutual interests. Afghanistan should therefore engage in the CPEC and Pakistan would gladly open the port of Karachi to increase Afghanistan’s exports. Other important areas of further cooperation are efforts against drug trafficking, border security and repatriation of refugees. On the subject of border security, despite the present difficulties, Afghanistan must look at the Durand Line issue through the prism of border management, rather than turning to closure of the borders.
The historical and social ties shared by many people living in the border regions cause them to travel across the border daily, but terrorists have taken advantage of this freedom of movement. It is therefore crucial to deny these roads as safe havens on both sides of the border. Border management and fencing are crucial to containing movement of unwanted persons. The border management could be improved through simple passport controls, as the ones Denmark and Sweden currently practice, where travelers’ IDs are checked when crossing the border. Such an initiative could be a solid starting point for cooperation.

Furthermore, the two countries must not be used by other countries for their own strategic gain. By using Afghan soil, India for example, has stepped up its covert actions in Baluchistan.

As a concluding remark, Pakistan and Afghanistan have had historical relations. Both countries will have to continue to work on resolving the region’s security challenges. Promoting mutual trust should be the first step to reinvigorating regional connectivity and peaceful coexistence.

**Major Mikkel Storm Jensen: “Danish Perceptions of the Regional Security Dynamics”**

Mikkel Storm Jensen’s presentation took a rather frank approach in assessing the possible future security scenarios for Afghanistan. This was based on his identification of national governance, as well as regional and international relations, as the two main drivers of instability in Afghanistan. The presentation argued that the current levels of governance are insufficient and will remain constant at best but are likely to decline, making it unlikely for the government to address the insurgency’s root causes. The détente between Pakistan and Afghanistan has not seen improvements lately, underlining a likely static or deteriorating development in the near future. As for the international donors, they could begin demanding larger accountability for their aid or use the aid as leverage to return Afghan migrants from Europe. The analysis outlined the stagnant Afghan economy and the government’s loss of territory to the insurgency as a result of failed governance.

**Main Drivers of Instability in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan’s governance is defined as its government’s ability to provide security, grievance solutions, collect stable revenue, and provide basic services to the population. The improvements made in governance since 2001 have not been sufficient. Furthermore, governance improvements have not been institutionalized but rather driven by individuals, making them less sustainable and easy to reverse. Governance is essential as it represents the government’s ability to address the root problems cau-
sing the insurgency. Assessing Afghanistan’s current level of governance, the following challenges stand out: 1) Insufficient revenue collection; 2) Inability to deal with corruption and nepotism; 3) Political instability; and 4) Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are hindered by the same issues of leadership, pay, and leave as in 2007, despite continued promises to address these issues, and reliance on extensive international economic and military support. These inadequate improvements in governance were achieved during a time of much greater international support from 2001 to 2014. While not discontinued, the current international engagement has decreased significantly; therefore, the likely future development is static or declining.

In terms of regional stability, Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan should be viewed through détente, in other words, to what extent improvements in relations between the two countries are likely to occur. Improvements would help to secure better border management, which then could address the issue of insurgency safe havens in Pakistan. The post-Karzai rapprochement to Pakistan has been challenged to a large extent by the border closings in June 2016; continued Afghan allegations that Pakistan supports insurgency in Afghanistan; the recent return of the Afghan refugees; Pakistan’s continued failure to deny insurgents safe haven; the Iran-India-Afghanistan infrastructure initiatives as well as Indian economic and military support to Afghanistan.

The signs of détente are not present, and if no actions are taken the likely development is probably a static or declining relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As for Afghanistan’s relationship with the international donors, the international donors have pledged $15 billion over the next four years. The US and other donor countries have demanded progress on governance - especially actions to reduce corruption. However, the donors have stated this demand previously without having applying any consequences when the Afghan government failed to deliver. Most likely, the donor countries engagement and presence in Afghanistan will decline over time as other priorities appear.

**Possible Outcomes**

In conclusion, two possible outcome scenarios were outlined – representing a short- and long-term scenario for Afghanistan from a Danish perspective when the main drivers of instability in Afghanistan are defined as its governance abilities and regional and international relationships.

The most likely scenario in a short-term time frame is that the Afghan economy stagnates as a result of low trade, low revenue generation, high dependency on international aid, and high migration. The security situation will deteriorate due to the government’s poor performance in addressing root problems as well as the challenges to capacity
building and maintaining a sufficient security force. Overall, the results in this scenario imply that the Afghan government will keep losing ground to the insurgency.

An even more pessimistic scenario appears to unfold over the long term. In the long-term scenario, we could see the economy decline as a result of the loss of a central government. With no central governance, the Taliban and warlords would be pitted against one another in a new Afghan civil war, and engaging external supporters will once again use Afghanistan to conduct war by proxy.


**Interactive Session 1**

The audience put various security, geopolitical, and governance questions to the panelists, which resulted in a lively debate. In the following section, key points in the discussion have been selected along with the answers/comments from the audience and panelists regarding their relevance to identifying common ground and obstacles in mutual trust-building: 1) The Indian and Pakistani relationship’s impact on Afghanistan; 2) Initiatives to create mutual trust; 3) The Taliban; and 4) Internal and External factors.

**The Indian and Pakistani Relationship’s Impact on Afghanistan**

The first question from the audience was addressed to Mr. Javeed concerning the Indian-Pakistani relationship and its impact on Afghanistan. Mr. Javeed responded that in order to understand Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan, it is important to take into account that Afghanistan geographically is part of the same regional context wherein the Indian-Pakistani security issue resides. He assessed that Pakistan has no problem with Indian-Afghan trade and economic cooperation, but when the coop-
eration is about security, it is perceived from a Pakistani point of view as an Indian effort to create a second front with Pakistan, which is an outcome that Pakistan simply cannot accept. In the past, India has used Afghanistan to challenge Pakistan, which has affected the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan negatively.

This led an Afghan participant to respond that Afghanistan is part of a greater game that is far bigger than the Indian and Pakistani security dilemma. Pakistan and other regional actors have to understand that the forces at play in Afghanistan are transnational and various groups benefit from the current instability. The regional actors must therefore widen their understanding of the conflict in Afghanistan beyond the India-Pakistan conflict and thereby engage in mutual trust building with this in mind.

**Initiatives to Create Mutual Trust**

It was shortly discussed how promoting student and professor exchanges at the highest level could lead to a greater understanding of each other and thereby facilitate important relations that can improve mutual trust building.

At several times, the media was brought forth as an important (even on some occasions decisive) actor whose influence either could promote or weaken the level of trust between the Afghan and Pakistani populations. In this relation, it was recommended that future seminars look into the role of the media in shaping the two populations’ perceptions and their impact on mutual trust building.

**The Taliban**

An Afghan delegate asked critically how the current Afghan government is supposed to trust Pakistan, when Pakistan in the past has hosted the Taliban during the civil war (1992-1996) and allegedly have continued to do so afterwards. Mr. Javed made it clear that Pakistan does not support the Taliban, e.g., the Haqqani Network, but while everyone is blaming Pakistan, Afghanistan has failed to see India’s and Iran’s support for insurgencies in Baluchistan. Concerning the broader discussion on this subject, Professor Sahki responded that the two countries need to look forward and not backward, while still trying to understand what went wrong in the past, so those mistakes will not be repeated. At the end of the discussion there appeared to be a consensus in the panel that blaming each other for the historical developments will be counterproductive and not support efforts to promote mutual trust building.

**Internal and External factors**

Professor Sahki stated that the insurgent groups in Baluchistan are not related to the Afghan government, and that the Afghan government has no interest in the insta-
bility that these groups create. Every Afghan has a hope for peace, and the Afghan government supports this in its policies.

It was argued that because ISAF forces were unable to eliminate the violence within Afghanistan, the Taliban and other groups must be terrorist funded and supported from external actors who benefit from chaos in Afghanistan. This logic was contested by Major Jensen who referred to the Taliban as insurgents that are able to operate due to the lack of governance and local grievances within Afghanistan. Unless the decisive factors of the corruption within the Afghan state (i.e., the police commanders' engagement in drug trafficking and the state's current lack of ability to provide basic public services to the Afghan population) are addressed, it was according to Major Jensen highly unlikely that the insurgency would be defeated. He emphasized that while the great game of Afghanistan matters, the internal factors have not been addressed sufficiently, and if changes are to be seen in relation to the great game, the Pakistani and Indian relationship would have to improve significantly – a scenario, which seems unlikely at the moment.

Interestingly, the discussion brought forth two different positions of understanding the root problems of Afghanistan in relation to whether they are primarily derived by internal or external factors. From an Afghan point of view, the main reason for instability is interference by external actors – especially Pakistan. On the other hand, a general perception in Pakistan is that the broad spectrum of security issues in Afghanistan is caused by a lack of representative government, as there is not enough focus on including different segments of the Afghan population. The importance on the different positions relates to how the current conflict in the region is understood, as it reveals the indicators that each part views as the largest obstacle for enhanced regional cooperation. This lesson is very important in designing and executing future projects aimed at increasing impact on or influence in the region.
Session 2 - Challenges and Opportunities to Internal stability: Capacities and Internal Military Operations

Mr. Halimullah Kousary: Sustainability of ANSF on the Battlefield – Where We Stand and What are the Limitations and Challenges

Mr. Halimullah Kousary gave an in-depth analysis of the major challenges that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is facing in fighting the Taliban insurgency forces in a post-US-withdrawal Afghanistan. After the US withdrawal, the Taliban orchestrated several attacks with the objective of territorial gains across Afghanistan, resulting in the ANA fighting the Taliban on multiple fronts while challenged by logistical issues. It was argued that the ANA should respond to this by changing their center of gravity from winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population to regaining the lost territory and thereby showing the civilian population that the ANA – and thereby the Afghan Government – is the stronger force in the country.

The presentation outlined the French military officer David Galula’s counterinsurgency (COIN) theory’s focus on winning the hearts and minds of the people in comparison to gaining territory. A change in this COIN approach should, however, be applied as the situation in Afghanistan does not call for a strategy based on a COIN approach but rather a Counter-Terrorism (CT) approach, which implies a non-negotiating line at the moment. This was derived from the argument that various anti-government forces operating in Afghanistan have both local, regional, and transnational objectives and cannot be viewed as a unified political entity that can be addressed in negotiating a political settlement.

The Taliban’s New Strategy

In the wake of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban has shifted their strategy to attacks carried out by smaller and more mobile groups. This has been manifested by its recent campaigns to drive out the ANA in sparsely populated areas, as well as in more symbolic attacks, e.g., the capture of Kunduz for two weeks in 2015 and later parts of the city in 2016.

The Taliban’s new strategy has posed several challenges for the ANA because it capitalizes on the army’s logistical challenges. The ANA has been forced to fight the Taliban on multiple fronts, which has indicated that the size of the security forces is insufficient as the ANA has become scattered across large areas as a direct result of this strategy. This became evident when the Taliban initiated an attack in Kunduz and Helmand simultaneously while the ANA was also occupied with fighting Daesh in the Nangarhar province.
The geography and weak infrastructure of Afghanistan further complicated the ANA’s response and logistical efforts to address the attacks on the multiple fronts simultaneously. The mountainous nature of the country and especially the border areas also present an advantage to the Taliban and other actors fighting the Afghan state, as this provides a good environment for safe havens and passages. Combined, the abovementioned logistical challenges are one of the main reasons why the ANA has faced difficulties in responding quickly to the attacks carried out across Afghanistan.

Another dimension that was brought forth during the presentation was the ANA’s work within the framework of International Humanitarian Law. While this has many benefits, it prompts the ANA to employ a more prudent approach when securing infrastructure and local economic structures, in sharp contrast to the Taliban who attack city centers without any regard for the post-attack situation.

**How to Combat the Taliban’s new strategy?**
Territorial gains should be pursued as the key objective in a new military strategy. In Afghanistan, it is a well-known fact that the Taliban brings conflict and chaos with them, leading to very low popular support for them, but in order for the population to support the ANA, it has to show itself as the party that can provide security for the population in the long run.

The center of gravity for the ANA should therefore be to isolate Taliban and reclaim their safe havens by gaining territory. Before this strategy can be pursued successfully, the ANA needs to be better equipped, further developed, and acquire air-support. The international community and regional stakeholders should in this aspect increase their military aid to Afghanistan in order to make the ANA capable of combating the Taliban and also help Afghanistan in ousting the transnational actors operating within the borders of Afghanistan.

*Session 2. Mr. Halimullah Kousary during his presentation: “Sustainability of the ANSF on the Battlefield - Where we Stand and What are the Limitations and Challenges”*. (RDDC Archive, 2016)
Professor Adeel Khan: Security Dynamics in Pakistan and an overview of the Challenges and Opportunities to Internal Stability

Professor Adeel Khan’s presentation took its point of departure from the following two key security dynamics in Pakistan: 1) Socio-economic security and, 2) Internal Security - external aggressive factors/forces. These factors are to be viewed as the two most important components in analyzing Pakistan's internal security challenges and opportunities. The large share of Pakistan's economy being based on agriculture is unsustainable as the population is estimated to rise to 300 million in 2050. Taking into consideration that Pakistan will not be able to expand its agricultural production in terms of territory, Adeel Khan concluded that changes are required as the socio-economic factors are the root cause of instability in Pakistan, and so far, the Pakistani Government has not properly addressed them.

Socio-economic Security

The socio-economic factors play a vital role in the internal security challenges that Pakistan is facing. The following five indicators were unfolded in the presentation: 1) Population; 2) Water; 3) Rule of Law; 4) Education; and 5) Peculiar economic circumstances.

Pakistan's current population is estimated to be almost 200 million, making Pakistan the 6th most populous country in the world, and with a median age at 22.7 years, it is a very young population in comparison to, e.g., the United States' median age at 37.9 years. Furthermore, Pakistan's population growth forecasts that the country's population will reach 300 million by 2050. This entails that Pakistan needs to drastically rethink its current economic system, where 34% of the economy is based on agriculture. A production that cannot be expanded since the populous country does not have additional suitable land to convert for agricultural purposes.

Concerning water security, Pakistan is the 31st most water-starved country in the world, and this will definitely spark social tensions regarding access to drinking water and agricultural production, when considering the estimated population growth.

The third indicator is the low degree of rule of law in Pakistan. A recent study placed Pakistan as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and as the second most corrupt country in South Asia. The absence of rule of law and lack of policing efforts to support it is exemplified by the police presence in Karachi, which is the fifth largest city in the world, but at the same time, it has the lowest number of police officers per citizen in the world.
Pakistan is ranked as 129 out of 144 on the global competitiveness index country-list, which designates the profitability of foreign investments. This position makes it very difficult for Pakistan to attract the much-needed capital in order to transition its economy away from agriculture. Indicating the peculiar economic situation Pakistan is residing in at the moment, the reliance on agriculture also makes the country vulnerable, since a flood or other natural disasters might shake the entire economic base of millions of Pakistanis, thereby having drastic effects on the national economy and potentially lead to social security challenges.

The lack of education in Pakistan also affects the security situation negatively. A recent UN study ranks Pakistan as one of the countries with the lowest literacy rate in the world, ranked 159th out of 177 countries.

The combined socio-economic factors above illustrate the unsustainable condition of Pakistan, and in 2050 when Pakistan is set to reach 300 million people, this condition will be heavily exacerbated unless reforms are introduced.

**Security Issues Related to Internal and External Aggressive Factors/Forces**

Pakistan faces several internal and external security challenges. Internal armed groups have turned to the use of violent means against the state and caused severe damage to the population. From 2003 to 2016, a conservative estimate of Pakistani fatalities is 61,204 – comprising civilians, security forces, and terrorist/insurgents. In order to rectify this, the socio-economic factors described earlier must be addressed through reforms and by revisiting policies that might have alienated the population from the government.

The first article of Pakistan’s constitution states that Pakistan consists of four regions (including FATA). This calls for a lot responsibility for the federal government to represent all of Pakistan. Governance failures in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) are a direct spoiler in this context, and as a recommendation it was argued that the people of FATA must gain a larger say in the federal government. Pakistan also has to deliver where it previously has failed, e.g., sponsoring schools and providing basic social services in FATA.

The Pakistani government has responded to the internal security challenges by reforming the army. Previously the army focused on gaining more firepower to balance India, but this was not successful and therefore it has reorganized itself to brigade levels that can conduct limited operations. The game changer has been giving the army more policing powers after it became engaged in internal operations.
In Kashmir, the latest security challenge was caused by the last election, where a Hindu extremist party won 26% of the vote, which was highly improbable outcome since 92% of Kashmir’s population is Muslim, prompting the people to take to the streets and protest.

While the internal security challenges are present and highly challenging in both Kashmir and FATA, Pakistan must constantly beware of the external threat India poses. The Indian army’s capabilities and size currently outmatch Pakistan’s, and with all the major rivers of Pakistan originating from India, issues such as water security gain an external dimension.

In conclusion, Prof. Khan stressed that many Muslim countries in the Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and African regions are dealing with violent armed groups committing terrorist attacks. He put forth the question whether this is because Islam is a violent religion, answering NO. The issues in these regions are due to a lack of jobs and education. Socio-economic factors are the main reasons why these regions are plagued by a lack of security and anti-government movements. Before these factors are addressed, the chance for stable security is slim to none.


Lt. Col. Hans Lundsgaard, RDDC, gave a presentation about strategic leadership and capacity building in relation to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The presentation addressed initiatives that can promote better security in Afghanistan by improving the educational level for the ANSF. According to Lt. Col. Lundsgaard’s own experience, trust is a crucial element in capacity building, and therefore the element of trust has to be focused on and implemented to a higher degree in military capacity building. In conclusion, it was argued that it is essential to create an innovative mindset in future leaders.

Based on experiences as a military advisor for the UN in Afghanistan, the presentation initially outlined that innovation and progress prerequisite a more holistically oriented leadership education. If innovation competences are implemented, they will provide the forces with new and more adaptable military tools that will enable them to navigate more efficiently in complex contexts and settings.

Generally, the presentation addressed three main points that focus on innovation and progress through holistic leadership education. First, enhanced expertise in relation to security issues is required, which can be accomplished by creating discipline and combat skills in the forces. Second, skills in creative thinking should be developed by fostering basic communication skills and by using common words for reflexivity.
Third, the ANSF should be motivated to solve the security challenges and therefore the identification of the forces’ motivation along with identification of improvement areas should be outlined. Furthermore, the motivation must be implemented in practice, and if successful, it can be transferred externally to the population.

The presentation addressed that there are four dimensions, which can help balance the leadership of security forces. The first dimension seeks to develop human relationship, which implies that the forces should be trained in establishing good interpersonal relations with the civilian population. The second dimension emphasized that the forces must adapt and renew unit practice in relation to social development, as well as politicians and population perception on the role of security forces, as this would help the forces sustain legitimacy in the broader communities. The third dimension highlighted the necessity for sustaining qualitative stability, which implies a focus on maintaining professionalism, structure, and continuity. The fourth and final dimension underlined that the forces should generate results – the forces must focus on developing combat power, energy, and perseverance.

In the second part, the presentation pointed out that holistic leadership can be divided into four elements; reflexivity, contact skills, combat skills, and discipline; and the
keyword for balancing these four elements is trust. All four elements should therefore include trust. In order to implement the elements, contact skills were highlighted as essential, and it is therefore vital to focus on and improve a force's ability to maintain awareness, cooperate, communicate, be flexible, and handle conflict.

In conclusion, the following points were listed as a way ahead in making innovation and progress through holistic leadership education;

- Leadership in security is an ongoing balance to cope
- Trust is the keyword for holistic security leadership
- Education together is part of shared development of skills
- Education in contact skills, training, reflexivity, discipline, and combat skills at the same time with a balanced approach

Awareness and focus on these points will, if implemented, guide the ANSF to ask the right questions in order to make the right contact leading to the right solutions.

**Interactive Session 2**

The interactive session focused on discussing the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the context of a military operational perspective as well as in a regional socio-economic context. Furthermore, it addressed initiatives to improve the Afghan National Army's capabilities.

The panel started out by discussing the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and addressed possible obstacles preventing mutual trust building. Professor Adeel Khan assessed that both countries have contributed to the distrustful relationship, resulting in the need for a more transparent way of conceiving collaboration if reconciliation is to be reached. Furthermore, Professor Khan stressed that it is important to involve the population and communities in both countries due to the many cultural and historical ties, which should be a driver in itself to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afterwards the discussion moved to address the lack of military cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani armies. In relation to this aspect, one of the Afghan participants stressed that the Pakistani army's capabilities are much stronger compared to those of its Afghan counterpart, resulting in an asymmetrical relationship complicating the two armies' possibility of engaging in cooperative projects and exercises. In connection with this, Professor Khan stressed that it is a huge problem that foreign nations are practically sponsoring the entire Afghan army as this reduces the possibilities for the Afghan military (and thereby the state) to make independent security decisions. Largely this influences the lack of cooperation between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Professor Khan therefore argued that it would be easier to promote mutual trust, if the Afghan army did not have a relationship of almost total dependency on the West and especially the US.

The panel highlighted that regional actors should engage and cooperate more with the Afghan army in order to increase cooperation on security between Afghanistan and the other regional actors and thereby shift political dependency from the West towards the regional states. Furthermore, this could also help improve the lack of communication between the involved actors in the region of South Asia.

Session 2. Participants during Interactive Session 2: “Challenges and Opportunities to Internal Stability: Capacities and Internal Military Operations”. (RDDC Archive, 2016)

Director Halimullah Kousary stated that only few Afghan governments have lasted more than five years during the past 30-40 years, which has made it difficult for the different Afghan governments to be transparent and renewable in their governance, which also has affected the military capacity of the Afghan Security Forces. Furthermore, Director Kousary argued that future military aid and support is necessary for the Afghan Security Forces, because it can improve the Afghan Army’s ability to
regain control of lost territory and thereby improve the internal stability. In addition to this, Lt. Col. Hans Lundsgaard stated that education must not be neglected in relation to military aid and support. Lt. Col. Lundsgaard therefore argued that to train, advice, and assist should be implemented as key concepts in relation to the capacity building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). If these core values were implemented into the ANSF, it would make the Afghan military more sustainable in their aims and goals, which also would increase their capacity in military operations and benefit internal stability.

Lastly, a remark was raised in relation to the general political situation in Afghanistan emphasizing that it is a fundamental problem for a state to have foreign powers funding a country’s security forces as it will affect political decisions made. Furthermore, it was argued that if ISAF forces are not able to reduce the dependency on external support for the army, Afghanistan will then continue to be a counterproductive factor in the greater picture of regional stability. The ANSF should develop toward being an independent and self-governing organization as this promotes internal stability in and of itself. However, the ANSF will still depend on Western aid in the future, because there are too many strategic areas that are controlled by the insurgent groups, and it is therefore vital to recapture these areas before the ANSF can initiate the path of independence. In regards to this aspect, Professor Khan highlighted that nation building normally take centuries, and patience is what is required, along with keeping long-term objectives in mind instead of continuously measuring mid- and short-term successes and failures.
Session 3 - Promoting Mutual Trust Building

Mr. Sayed Mahdi Munadi, “The Role of Economic Initiatives on Af-Pak Trust Building”

Mr. Munadi gave a presentation about how economics can be used as an element for building mutual trust in the region, and thereby create better security for the people in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He argued that economic issues often are overlooked and downplayed because of the strong focus on security issues, and therefore initiatives are needed that can improve the economy, as this will help enhance the regional peacebuilding process. In conclusion, he stressed that all the actors in the region of South and Central Asia have an interest in putting forth economic initiatives, which arguably would serve as a sustainable factor in economic projects in a regional setting.

The presentation outlined how the role of economic cooperation could be used as a cornerstone for building trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. From his point of view, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has stagnated because everything is related to issues of securitization, which has led to a state of affairs in which even people-to-people contact has been securitized.

Afghanistan and Pakistan in many ways share the same culture, which therefore can be used to improve the current lack of trust and cooperation between the two countries. This calls for both countries to develop economic projects that can improve the civilian populations’ access to resources. Such projects have already been launched, and when finalized they should be able to influence the regional stability in general, as they will raise the economic stakes of engaging in conflicts. The four most prominent projects of this type is:

1. **TAPI Pipeline** – A pipeline that will transport gas between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India
2. **CASA-1000** – A project that will improve the export of surplus hydroelectricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan and Afghanistan
3. **CPEC** – A project between China and Pakistan that seeks to improve the infrastructure, which will improve the economic possibilities in the region
4. **APTTA** – A bilateral trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which seeks to improve the trade conditions for both Afghanistan and Pakistan

In order to address the resolution and recommendation to the current security challenges it was highlighted that economic initiatives should not only be viewed as a tool to promote reconciliation and stability, but as a solution in itself. Also emphasized was economic diplomacy in peace negotiations through securing the economic initiatives...
with Taliban and other groups. Both countries in negotiation with each other and in meetings with Taliban groups can prioritize saving TAPI, CASA1000, APTTA and other economic initiatives. It was argued that if economic affairs are not prioritized, the political decision makers will not have the capability to amend the current security challenges. Therefore, security issues have to be addressed in a way of an economically oriented security situation.

In conclusion, bilateral renegotiation was stressed as a tool for cooperation, which could be expanded by establishing state institutions to focus directly on implementing bilateral economic cooperation. Though support from all the main regional actors would be most beneficial in order to create sustainable economically based projects, it should not halt development of bilateral cooperation.


PhD fellow Mr. Jakob Brink Rasmussen, “Historical Lessons of Mutual Trust Building: Introducing the “Understand to Prevent” Model (U2P)”

In this session, Mr. Rasmussen presented the so-called “U2P model”. The model guides the military planner on how to designate operational planning to prevent wars and conflicts from escalating. It was argued that the U2P model can be applied to make military planners capable of understanding when to engage, what military tools to employ, and what factors that can trigger or deescalate potential conflict.
In conclusion, Mr. Rasmussen argued that there is a window of opportunity in all escalating conflicts; hence, the military planner has the possibility of bolstering the prevention of conflict escalation.

The U2P model is based on an ongoing project that applies empirical and statistical data from conflicts and wars over the last 30-40 years. The project was founded by MCDC, which is a multinational force development initiative that focuses on collaboratively developing concepts and capabilities that address the challenges associated with conducting coalition and multinational operations. The aim of this project has been to identify the characteristics of these conflicts in order to explore how military forces can contribute to the upstream prevention of violent conflicts and how relevant actors can forge a common progressive approach. To succeed in this task, the role of the military planner should be to understand what drives the specific conflict, identify the main actors, and obtain knowledge of each actor’s role in the conflict.

The project advocates earlier military engagement, which implies military planners to extend and develop competencies beyond war fighting. If the military planner moves the starting point of engagement, it is vital that preventive military actions shift the focus from crisis response to other aspects, such as managing the conflict, preventing violence from escalating and supporting the peace building process.

By using a focus different to the current prevention model based on concepts such as shape, persuade, deter, coerce, and intervene, the military planner should employ a new human-centered model, based on concepts such as understand, engage, act, and endure. If implemented, this shift in approach could expand the military planner’s capability to end wars before they even start. In a comparative notion, the presentation highlighted that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) between 1992 and 2000 serves as a sound example of how timely action by the international community prevented a conflict from escalating into war.

The following points summarize the model and calls attention to the crucial elements for preventing conflict escalation:

1. Domestic authorities and international organizations need to show politicians that they can work and act together
2. Military deployment before significant violence has occurred can have a strong deterrent effect, especially if done at the invitation of the host nation’s government
3. Institutions other than the United Nations – and a broad range of international actors working together – can make a significant contribution to effective prevention
4. Military actors can effectively support activities beyond the purely military domain
In conclusion, the model stresses the importance for the military planner to go beyond normal military standards. Aspects such as protection of civilians, gender perspectives, rule of law, and security sector reforms need to be included in the military toolbox in order to sufficiently promote mutual trust building and reconciliation.


**Professor Naheed Farid, “Changing the Narrative in Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy and the Role of Pakistan”**

The presentation by Professor Farid pointed to the necessity for creating a new narrative in Afghanistan. It was argued that the present narrative in Afghanistan has failed because security issues have dominated the agenda. Instead, a new narrative should be formed on an economic approach in order to create an increased interest in Afghanistan from its neighboring countries to make these countries look for opportunities in Afghanistan rather than constraints. In conclusion, it was highlighted that an identification of common ground, specifically regarding economic initiatives, would promote stability in the region.
Based on her own background and experiences as a member of the Afghan Parliament representing the Herat Province, her presentation initially outlined the disputes and issues that Afghanistan has with its neighboring countries. The main problems concern water disputes and border issues, mainly with Iran and Pakistan. Furthermore, Afghan refugees also play an important role for the possibilities for future cooperation and collaboration, as the high number of Afghan refugees have a massive impact on the neighboring countries. In itself, this calls for a strong incentive for all involved states in the region to cooperate on stabilization in Afghanistan in order to keep the number of Afghan refugees from increasing.

Generally, all these issues are related to the present – and previous - narrative in Afghanistan and the objective of security is pursued by focusing on military means and hereby keeping the war machine running. This narrative has been created through the historical development, and politicians in the whole region have failed in their objective to create security and peace for their populations be continuing on this path. The main problem is that politicians are using all available resources to sustain the war machine instead of, e.g., economic projects that focus on improving the living conditions for the civilian population. It was stressed that security must be considered in a broader
perspective and especially in an economic perspective as this could prove as a key driver in mutual trust building and thereby also impact the reconciliation process.

In conclusion, the presentation sought to address how a new and different narrative should be implemented in Afghanistan. A new narrative should take the assessment of improving Afghanistan’s security dynamics by other means than military capabilities into consideration in order to identify common ground between Afghanistan and its neighbors. This common ground for cooperation should be based on economic approaches focused on opportunities that can create an economic pull effect for states in the region. By following this approach, more investment opportunities and jobs could be created inside Afghanistan, which will then help the regional peacebuilding process in general. This however, requires that Pakistan as a state also develops or even change its narratives on militant groups. The distinction between good and bad militant groups without taking the view of the Afghan government into consideration will halt development in all other areas, and this needs to change.

As a final remark, it was highlighted which economic sectors that could pose as starting points in creating this narrative. The examples concerned economic initiatives that will be able to increase the population’s access to electricity, gas, railroads, highways, water, and energy resources. In conclusion, it was argued, that promoting this new narrative would cause a stronger focus on economic opportunities rather than security constraints and could enhance cooperation at the state level and beneath.

Senior Researcher Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Guardians of God - Initiating Reconciliation: Understanding the Pakistani Taliban”

The presentation by Ms. Sheikh outlined the perspectives behind her new book “Guardians of God”, which analyzes the Pakistani Taliban movement and how it differs from Afghan Taliban. In particular Ms. Sheikh argued that religion plays a significant role for Pakistani Taliban adherents, which makes the conflict between the main Pakistani faction of the Taliban, namely the TTP, and the Pakistani Government very complicated. It was concluded that we need to include religion and their religious imagery in our perspectives, if peace talks with the Taliban are to succeed.

The presentation addressed the ideas behind “Guardians of God”, which is based on empirical data from interviews with Pakistani Taliban leaders and their propaganda materials such as leaflets, speeches, and press releases. The book presents a study that outlines the ideology behind the TTP movement and thereby provides a nuanced and detailed insight into the movement in order to understand how religion plays a role for the TTP’s justification of violence.
Generally, TTP is organized as an umbrella organization with many small factions operating in the outskirts of the TTP leadership. Some of the movements that joined the umbrella organization were founded before 2001 while others were founded as a direct response to the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Religion both plays an offensive and aggressive role in the Taliban narratives, but most of all it is part of a defensive narrative in which the Taliban identify themselves as defenders of religious values. Religious values as drivers are thus used to sow resentment and resistance against the Pakistani Government. The presentation also emphasized self-perception in the TTP as the movement views itself not only as guardians of God but also as guardians of local societies, and therefore see religion as a vital element in their fight in Pakistan. As the Pakistani Government has not been able to control or uphold an adequate level of rule of law in the country, the TTP has been in a position to promote the religious values of sharia as an alternative to especially the civilian population in rural areas in relation to upholding the rule of law, which has increased their power in these areas. The Taliban has been criticizing the lack of judicial infrastructure in the tribal areas.

Drone strikes was also determined as having a major impact in relation to civilian support for TTP, which of course especially regards people in the areas that have suffered a high number of drone strikes. A high amount of the population in Pakistan feels insulted by the drone strikes as they are carried out by a foreign state on Pakistani soil, which has led to increased support for the TTP in urban areas. The result has been that the movement now poses an even bigger challenge for the Pakistani Government by increasing instability in Pakistan, which also has spillover effects to the security situation in Afghanistan.

In conclusion, it was argued that religion is important as a factor that provides legitimacy to the Taliban narratives, but this should not be taken as if it is the root of all the security-related problems in Pakistan, as the conflict with TTP is far more complex than that. Therefore, it is also important to understand the historical development of the conflict if a reconciliation process is to be initiated. Only by understanding the particular conflict constellation, the interplay between the secular and religious justifications for violence, and by looking into the role of the military responses, will it be possible to work on potential solutions to the problem of terrorism.

Interactive session 3 - Promoting Mutual Trust Building

Interactive session 3 focused on the relationship between the Pakistani Government and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in regards to the future possibilities for reconciliation. Secondly, the panel discussed how the insurgents groups play a role regarding the lack of mutual
trust between the main actors involved. Lastly, the interactive session addressed initiatives that could help improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The panel started by addressing that negotiation attempts already had taken place in 2014, which led to a split within the Pakistani Taliban between those who supported and those who were against the negotiations. In relation to that aspect, Senior Researcher Sheikh highlighted that there are many dimensions to the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and therefore it is important to understand the ideology behind the two insurgent groups in order to design useful resolutions to the conflict. As an example, Senior Researcher Sheikh submitted that the Pakistani government and military have had huge difficulties with the implementation of rule of law in the tribal areas, which have pushed many locals from the rural areas towards the TPP, because the TPP has become the legal authority the tribal areas. Furthermore, Ms. Sheikh emphasized that military operations have become a norm in all of Pakistan due to the increased number of insurgency operations, which have damaged the trust between the military and the population. As a solution, the panel addressed that the Pakistani Police Force to a higher degree should be in charge of counterinsurgency operations in the urban areas, as this could help improve the level of trust between the government and the population in the urban areas.

In relation to that aspect, Executive Director Athar Muhammad Javed emphasized that it is important to understand that the insurgent groups fight unconstrained by the rule of law, which makes it highly difficult for the Pakistani government to fight the insurgent groups without using its military forces. Furthermore, it was underlined that it is not possible for the Pakistan government to lead the fight against the Taliban alone, because the Taliban is a transnational organization that often operates in the border areas, and therefore it is important to include other regional actors.

The interactive session then focused on discussing the differences and similarities between the Afghan Taliban and the TPP. The panel stressed that Afghanistan Taliban and TTP share common religious leaders, which in some ways has created a type of brotherhood between the two movements. However, the panel also stressed that the two movements have many differences, such as divided perceptions of who is their enemy, which means that the two movements, to a large extent, work independently of one another and do not cooperate on missions. The panel therefore concluded that we have to separate the two groups from each other in order to understand the conflict and come up with possible solutions to the conflicts in both countries.

The last subject discussed by the panel addressed funding initiatives that could be used to improve reconciliation between the involved actors in the region. Mr. Munadi
highlighted economic projects as a useful tool for fostering reconciliation between the states in the region. Reconciliation was emphasized as an important factor because it also would lead to improved security in both countries. In relation to this, Professor Farid argued that Pakistan should invest more resources in Afghanistan as this would help to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, Professor Farid highlighted that Pakistani and Afghan politicians have failed to provide security for their populations. Thus, people feel neglected and abandoned by their government in both countries, which means they have been willing to join and support insurgent groups in hope of achieving better security for themselves. As a final remark, PhD Fellow Rasmussen argued that all the involved actors make it difficult to analyze and understand the current conflict truthfully, and it is therefore vital to examine the actors’ involvement more comprehensively before launching economic initiatives.

Introduction
This session concerned a presentation of the book “Regional Stability & Peacebuilding: Initiating Reconciliation Between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond”, which was published in 2016 by the Royal Danish Defence College. The book is based on a conference held in Islamabad in 2014 as part of the Danish Peace and Stabilization Program for reconciliation and trust building in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A key objective in the program is to facilitate coherence and integration of stabilization initiatives across authorities despite differences in mandates and operational measures and processes. The following section of this report presents excerpts from each chapter in terms of introductions and conclusions in order to provide a brief overview of the security development in the region along with pointing out obstacles and possibilities in promoting regional stability and peace building in the region of South Asia.

In general, the book aims at explaining the main security knots preventing stability from emerging and on that basis to test whether a different approach in addressing these knots or challenges could be affected by a change in perception as well as in focus. By explaining why track II diplomacy should have a key role and accentuating the fact that track I diplomacy in a bottom-up approach is deadlocked, the overall frame can be perceived, as an attempt to find light where there is none. Yet pursuing an innovative and different approach to the process of peacebuilding should be seen as an identification of possible future tools to be explored. For this reason, politicians, officials, and persons with an interest in this region in general will benefit from the perspectives presented here.

Chapter 1 - Sovereignty, State Capacity, and Regional Relations: Challenges of Peace Building in Central Asia by William Maley

Introduction
The challenges that confront attempts at peace building both within and between the key states of the Central and West Asian space are numerous and relatively easy to list. This chapter seeks to locate these challenges within a wider framework. The region faces a set of interlocking dilemmas. The basic units that comprise it are ‘sovereign states’, but a number of these either lack the capacity to prevent their territory from being used by revisionist non-state actors or actively support such actors as tools in the pursuit of their own geopolitical objectives. When ‘quasi-states’ genuinely cannot prevent the misuse of their territory, the credibility of their commitments is likely to
suffer. Furthermore, when states are covert backers of extremists, this likely involves them in a considerable amount of duplicity, which in turn militates against the development of trust between different actors in the region, closing a vicious circle from which it is very difficult to escape.

From the analysis in this chapter, it becomes clear that supporting revisionist non-state actors in this way is an exceedingly dangerous undertaking, as well as being in conflict with principles of international society that require a state to prevent its territory from being used as a base for a ‘creeping invasion’. To escape from the vicious circle, it is necessary that states disposed to act in this destructive fashion take steps to moderate their behavior. There is no guarantee that this will happen, but diplomatic means can be used to try to encourage more constructive patterns of engagement.

**Conclusion**

One final point is worth making to conclude this discussion. A powerful curse that has blighted this region has been a focus, on the part of key leaders, on the short rather than long run. Babar’s promotion of the Taliban in 1994 is but one example of a tendency that has been apparent in almost every major state; some Afghan leaders have blithely pursued the cause of ‘Pushtunistan’, to equally dismal effect. Too many leaders in the region, for too long, have been content to adopt an ‘After me, the...
deluge’ mindset. The consequence has been littering of the landscape with a range of Frankenstein monsters, in the form of armed groups that have only weak links to the societies in which they operate and a disposition toward using extreme violence to achieve their ends. The most insightful response to such a mindset on the part of leaders is one that was articulated in the distant past by the Prophet Hosea: ‘Those who sow the wind shall reap the whirlwind’. Southwest Asia has a desperate need for leaders who keep this awful warning firmly in mind.

Chapter 2 - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India: Opportunities for Peace and Conflict by Yunas Samad

Introduction
This paper considers the questions of whether US withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to a proxy war between Pakistan and India and how other regional players will respond. Such a conflict has the potential of undermining the US-led strategy of stabilizing the country and broadening into a wider conflict between the two South Asian powers. The paper will also consider whether conflict is inevitable and whether there are any alternative scenarios in which conflict can be avoided.

The first thing that strikes one when discussing the region (Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of South and Central Asia and the Middle East) is the issue of complexity, which is increasing with the US and NATO drawdown. There are far more players involved in the region that have interests in its development than simply what the title of this paper suggests. So, while Pakistan and India are major rivals in Afghanistan and have stakes in regional stability, there are other players operating besides NATO, i.e., regional powers such as Russia and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia. This heady mix of competing powers can make any prognosis challenging. The second difficulty is that the audience: Practitioners and policy-makers have a far more intimate and detailed understanding of various aspects of regional developments. Given these two factors, the thrust of this paper is deliberately to construct an overly pessimistic and an optimistic scenario knowing that practitioners and policy-makers perhaps would chart a more pragmatic course between these two contending visions. The purpose is to show two very different possibilities, and these scenarios will be informed by three different but overlapping perspectives from international relations theory: Neo-realism, liberalism and social constructivism.

Conclusion
This paper constructs two scenarios: A pessimistic and an optimistic one deliberately as two distinct categories to draw attention to the potential seriousness of the situation. The Taliban in the first instance will test the mettle of the regime in Kabul on the battlefield before negotiating a settlement. It was the Taliban offensive and crumbling
of the Afghan national army and security forces that forced President Obama to halt troop withdrawal indefinitely to prevent the country from descending into chaos. The potential making of a proxy war with the Taliban backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia against a Kabul regime supported by a coalition of Iran and Russia led by India, however, has receded but remains a possibility. If this worst-case scenario develops then tensions with India on the western border will spread to the eastern front.

An alternative strategy is to nurture economic and cultural interdependence between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Trade, investment, energy as well as cultural ties are all variables that can cement relations between the two countries through a judicious combination of soft and hard power. However, the question is whether India would allow this development and the suggestion is that it may be better to think in a regional terms and think explicitly of India-Pakistan-Afghanistan as a unit for an interdependence approach. India’s hunger for energy converges with Afghanistan’s desire to become an energy hub and conduit of Central Asian gas and Pakistan’s own energy needs and trade and investment interests with both countries. A regional approach to interdependence would raise the cost of hard power and facilitate the agreement on red lines for all three countries. To assist this process, it is useful to take a leaf out of the non-official interactions between India and Pakistan. Track II diplomacy and people-to-people contact has played a positive role in improving relations and generating thinking outside of the box. The same approach would be useful in Afghan-Pakistani relations for floating innovative approaches to settling differences, clarifying red lines and promoting new ideas for collaboration. Overall, it would change the ambiance of how the two countries are perceived by their societies and generate internal impetus for better relations and support the shift to interdependence.

Chapter 3 - Why the United States will stay engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan beyond 2017 by Peter Viggo Jakobsen

Introduction

American staying power in Afghanistan has been questioned ever since the process of drawing down US and NATO forces began. By early 2017 the United States plans to have 5,500 troops left in Afghanistan (4,500 more than initially planned), while NATO will have 11,000 personnel. The drawdown has unsurprisingly fueled widespread fears of abandonment in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, where no one has forgotten that the US turned its back on their region the minute the Soviet Union had left Afghanistan in 1989.

Most analysts expect budget constraints, lack of public support and more important security challenges (i.e. China, Russia and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) to induce American and allied decision makers to limit their involvement to a minimum
beyond 2017. As Cordesman has pointed out, Western troop withdrawals are usually followed by significant reductions in development assistance, and if this happens in Afghanistan, the state institutions and the security forces that the US-led coalition has helped to establish will collapse. In 2015 60% of the Afghan national budget was funded by international donors, and the Afghans are only capable of raising some $2 billion in revenues a year. To put this number in perspective, it costs $5-6 billion per year to maintain the Afghan security forces at their current levels, and the International Monetary Fund expects the funding gap between domestic revenue and operating expenses to remain at about $7.7 billion through 2018.

To avoid a collapse in security and governance similar to the ones experienced by Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and by Iraq after the American withdrawal in December 2011, the Western powers must stay engaged well beyond 2017 and continue to underwrite a large part of the Afghan national budget and support its security forces.

The future of Afghanistan therefore hinges on the willingness of the United States to stay engaged after 2017. If the United States cuts or significantly reduces its military and economic support to the Afghan regime, other international donors will quickly follow suit. America’s European allies are generally eager to leave and have primarily stayed engaged because of their desire to preserve a good relationship with the United States. The current policy debate in the United States on Afghanistan focuses primarily on whether the US should stay engaged, and whether the Obama Administration is withdrawing too quickly. Few analyses have dealt in depth with the question of US staying power at any length theoretically. The assumption in most analyses is simply that US, and hence Western, interest will drop once the troops have been withdrawn and that lack of money and public support will induce American decision makers to limit their involvement to a minimum beyond 2017.

This chapter takes issue with this view arguing that the American willingness to stay engaged first and foremost will depend upon the ability of the US President to craft a strategic narrative that can convince a majority of the members of Congress that it is necessary to stay engaged, that it is the right thing to do, and that the United States, Afghanistan and the world will benefit from it. In addition, the President must promise success at an acceptable price and deliver it by demonstrating that progress is being made on a continuous basis.

My argument has three parts: Part one explains why elite consensus is the key to sustain the US engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017, and why a successful strategic narrative is required to create it. It provides an analytic framework specifying the
requirements for success that a strategic narrative must meet in order to convince its intended audience. Part two shows how President Obama’s Afghanistan narrative met all these requirements for success and maintained US elite consensus for his 2009-2015 Afghanistan strategy. By equating success with the drawdown of US troops, Obama was able to present the steady stream of soldiers returning home as incontrovertible proof to Congress and the American people that his strategy was working. Part three discusses the implications of these findings for sustaining the American engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017. They suggest that is possible to do so, provided that the US President can craft a new strategic narrative that promises and delivers success in a clear and compelling way to the US Congress and the American people.

**Conclusion**

The United States will not abandon Afghanistan in 2017. The US will not be forced out by a lack of public support or financial difficulties. These factors did not prevent President Obama from sending more troops, civilian specialists and money to Afghanistan in 2009, and they need not prevent his successor from staying engaged and continue to fund the Afghan security forces and Afghan state well beyond 2017. Obama overcame these obstacles and secured elite consensus for his strategy by crafting a strategic narrative in support of his strategy that successfully convinced the Beltway elites that the surge was necessary, in accordance with US values, ideals and role conceptions, and that the strategy was likely to work. Obama demonstrated this to be the case by bringing most of his troops home on time.

Obama also succeeded in laying the foundation for continued US engagement beyond 2017 by creating a context in which many analysts and members of Congress criticize Obama for withdrawing his forces and scaling down economic assistance too fast. This sentiment can be exploited by his successor to keep the United States engaged. To do so the next President will have to craft a strategic narrative that meets the requirements for success stipulated by the framework presented in this chapter. It worked for Obama and there is no reason why it should not work for his successor as well.

This said, the United States cannot by itself generate the measurable progress that continued engagement will also require. A perfectly constructed narrative is necessary but not sufficient to sustain a continued American and hence Western presence beyond 2017. The future US engagement will also be determined by the actions of the Afghan government as well as regional actors, some of which are analyzed in other chapters in this volume. While a continued US presence is critical to ensure continued Western engagement in terms of development assistance and security assistance, this engagement will be terminated if the Afghan government and the regional actors do not cooperate with respect to enhancing regional stability. At the end of the day, their actions will make or break the ongoing efforts to stabilize the South Asia region.
Chapter 4 - European ‘Stabilization through Association’: Five Lessons for Future Stability by Annemarie Peen Rodt

Introduction
In 2012, the Nobel Committee awarded the European Union (EU) its Peace Prize. It commemorated the building and sustaining of peace between Europeans, a process in which the Nobel Committee proposed that the EU and its predecessors had played an important part. It explicitly commended the Union’s success in repeatedly reconciling a divided continent and complimented its efforts to build peace beyond its borders. But does the EU (continue to) deserve such praise?

This contribution examines European peacebuilding from the early integration of post-Second World War economies, through the uniting of Europe after the Cold War to contemporary conflict management efforts in the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighborhood. The purpose of this endeavor is to examine whether lessons from the European experience can be observed that may facilitate future regional stabilization processes – within and beyond the Union.

Conclusions for Future Stability in Europe and beyond
This final section concludes how the lessons observed above may be interpreted and implemented. As this contribution focused on the European region, it will limit itself to lessons for future stabilization in Europe, although these may very well be of interest further afield. Six countries are caught in the current political conflict between the EU and Russia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Currently, Brussels and Moscow are equally expecting these countries to show allegiance – through association – with one or the other, neither allowing them neutrality nor close cooperation with both their powerful neighbors. This is a dangerous strategy, particularly when the countries in question have identity conflicts of their own that divide them on these exact issues. Therefore, the EU must escape temptations of path dependency, which could provoke further destabilization rather than the intended stabilization through association. Instead, it should consider carefully its past experiences. The step-by-step approach that proved successful in European peacebuilding was a process rather than a single intervention or agreement, which gradually built sustainable peace, and the Union has applied many different types of association with third countries.

The EU and its supporters in the eastern neighborhood have every reason to be patient, as the Union has ample experience of European integration in the end materializing peacefully despite a number of hurdles along the way. These are not the first countries to be ‘caught in the middle’ or indeed to experience both Russian resistance and European reluctance to their closer association with the Union. The countries in Central
and Eastern Europe, for example, eventually joined, as did Finland and Sweden, which were and remain ‘neutral’ between East and West. Likewise, various countries are today closely associated with the Union despite the initial vetoes of their membership either by existing members, like the French veto against British accession, domestic vetoes as in the case of Norway or Russian resistance as in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece have transitioned from authoritarian regimes and later joined the Union successfully. Internal transitions have also gradually resolved intra-state conflicts in old member states like the UK and Spain, not to mention applicant countries in the Western Balkans, which are increasingly working together – slowly but surely – to move closer to the Union. However, conflict resolution is not a given for EU member states, applicants or associates, as seen in the case of Cyprus, which remains divided. Finally, association does not necessarily mean membership, as existing alternatives illustrate. For example, Norway and Switzerland have decided to remain outside the Union after negative popular referenda on accession but still remain closely associated to the EU in different ways. Participation in the European Economic Area, an option, which Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway opted for instead of full membership, arguably resembles the Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) that Ukraine and Moldova have signed with the EU. Some observers have argued that this might also be an option for countries like Belarus, which currently has much closer links to Russia. Overall, the past demonstrates that these relationships are not static and can change in response to the wishes of the EU and its associates – as long as they can find solutions that are favored or at least accepted both inside and outside the Union.

This contribution showed how a European ‘stabilization through association’ doctrine has emerged and framed not only the Union’s initial establishment and later enlargement but continues to guide also its Neighborhood Policy and Crisis Management initiatives. These, it was argued, like the Community’s early peace initiatives, are based on the belief and later experience that armed conflicts can be managed and ultimately transformed through association (and sometimes integration) believed to bring peace to otherwise unstable regions. This has proved to be a remarkably successful enterprise within the EU. Nonetheless, European peacebuilding certainly has (had) its challenges – inside as well as outside the Union, and we are nowhere near the end of history. For now, we can celebrate 70 years of peace within the European Communities, and although conflicts and challenges remain, a peace persists within the Union, which was difficult to imagine during the Second World War, the Cold War – or even 20 years ago in the Balkans. Who knows what the future will bring? No matter what, it seems there are lessons to be learned from the European experience – about regional peacebuilding, its potential as well as its problems, if not yet its end results.
Closing Session

Consultant David Vestenskov, RDDC

As coordinator, my final remarks addressed how track II diplomacy can be applied to create mutual trust and reconciliation between the main actors in the region of Central and South Asia. Further, I emphasized that it is necessary to make initiatives for cooperation that can be implemented speedily on the ground level through people-to-people contact.

In the near future, it will be necessary to think of strategic solutions that can be implemented in terms of a defined subjective victory of both countries. Reconciliation and stability is without a doubt a vital element for both countries in a long-term perspective. However, reconciliation cannot take place just on long-term objectives as politics of conflict resolution and reconciliation always is a fragile process when carried out in and with support from democratic countries where short-term objectives apply because of relatively short election periods. Instead of expecting a strategic political solution among all states in the region, it could prove useful to promote innovation at the lower levels as this can influence the higher levels in a more sustainable manner and hereby support the long-term objectives of peacebuilding.

One way of doing this relates to contact between companies and governments, because big companies often have a very big impact on the political level due to their contribution to a country’s economy as well as its labor supply. An example of this is the Danish shipping company Maersk where the former Director of Maersk, Mr. Maersk McKinney Moeller, was indeed the only person in Denmark that could show up at the Danish Prime Minister’s office without prior appointment, illustrating that he had the capability to influence the political game without being a politician. Thus, to make big companies engage across borders in the region can be a very useful tool to affect the political level in a more cooperative manner. In this relation, the European Union can serve as an example as it could be argued that raising the economic stakes of engaging in a conflict limits the political appetite for policies that could lead to a potential conflict. Companies can therefore indirectly push the political level towards cooperation and reconciliation.

Finally, in order to use and expand track II diplomacy, people need to keep interacting and keep supporting forums of dialogue, as this also influences politicians to engage in trust building or at the very least keep lines of communication open in order to be prepared when a window of opportunity appears.
Deputy Director General Mirwais Balkhi, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Director Mirwais Balkhi addressed how these seminars in the long-term perspective can be improved to enhance the work of reconciliation and mutual trust building in the framework of the Danish Stabilization Programme.

The speech highlighted that it is beneficial to address practical solutions in relation to the region’s problems. It was clarified that people on the ground do not understand how to commit to the political game, because their main objective is security for themselves and their family. The presentation therefore highly recommended to keep holding these seminars in order to understand all these mechanisms of the peace building process. Furthermore, it was stated that in order to improve these seminars, it is necessary to increase the amount of perspectives, and therefore essential to concretize the objective around the main actors of the region. This would help to facilitate a forum, including more regional actors and their prospects in order to give a fulfilling perspective on the security issues in the region. It was therefore argued that states such as India and China should engage more in these seminars, as this would involve the driving forces of the region.

Lastly, Director Balkhi stated that future seminars should also take place in Afghanistan, as this would be a useful setting and provide the possibility for more of the main actors to participate and engage in the seminar. Furthermore, this would also create a setting for different ethnic groups in each country to participate, which would improve the understanding of the different security issues that Afghanistan faces. As a final remark, special thanks was addressed to all the participants for their contribution to the objective of creating mutual trust and reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Dean Ole Kværnø, RDDC

Dean Kværnø addressed some of the key lessons learned from this seminar. Furthermore, his remarks emphasized the importance of joint seminars, as they are an essential tool for engaging in mutual trust building and reconciliation.

Dean Kværnø started by addressing that the seminar itself could not stand alone as the very essence of track II diplomacy in promoting reconciliation and mutual trust is dependent on interaction and discussions in forums of this kind. It was emphasized that the completion of each seminar is a small step on the road of peace building. However, these seminars will not provide total solutions. What they can do is facilitate dialogues and help identify common ground and obstacles in order to generate ideas of initiating partial solutions to overcoming the obstacles. It is therefore important
to be realistic in relation to this objective, as thinking in total solutions only might be an obstacle in itself for smaller steps to take place.

As a final remark, Dean Kværnø stressed that the seminar had served its purpose as every participant had shown great spirit and good activity, which indicates that there is a will to improve the level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan in both countries.
Concluding remarks

A Few Evaluating Remarks from the Afghan Delegation
The conference was generally perceived as a positive one. The environment of the conference was very academic and it was well managed and moderated. However, given the amount of resources spent on the seminar, it is deemed that the profile of such a conference needs to be heightened. RDDC is therefore encouraged to invite mass media for coverage of future seminars.

Pakistan did not have a visible presence, as party to the issues; Pakistan’s solid presence in such a conference would boost the possibilities to agree on ways to build trust between the two nations.

The reports of such conferences form an important element of these conferences in terms of establishing and developing knowledge and recommendations that can be implemented at an institutional level. RDDC have done a very good job in that respect. MOFA appreciate the comprehensive reports from RDDC on each of the conferences.

Way ahead through the Lenses of RDDC
The seminar included a lively debate, where the various speakers presented their perspectives in a very direct tone, which from time took the form of a blame game between the Pakistani and Afghan delegates. However, RDDC would like to stress that the direct tone in this seminar should be regarded as part of a dynamic process, and based on experiences from trust building seminars during the last three years, facilitation of a constructive forum in which a free and lively debate between the participants can take place is a necessary stepping stone in achieving progress. It is therefore important to understand that this seminar does not create a framework for political summits, nor does it intend to. Instead, it aims at creating a framework for sharing viewpoints as a foundation for a subsequent dialogue. This dialogue generates communication channels that are the very essence of the seminars, which in a long-term perspective can establish a network where disagreements and conflicts can be prevented from escalating.

As a recommendation for future seminars, it would be appropriate to have a better balance and variety of officials and diplomats versus researchers and subject matter experts attending the seminars in order for the findings to be obtained by institutions that have the ability to influence opinions and policies of the organizations they represent. In conclusion, the seminar served its purpose of establishing a forum for dialogue and opening up communication channels across borders, but tracking the findings’ implementation in political organizations requires a stronger focus onward as
it can serve as a tool to increase mutual trust and thereby igniting paths reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Speakers - In order of appearance

Mr. Ole Kværnø has been Dean of the Royal Danish Defence College since 2013. His recent prior postings were serving as Dean of the Baltic Defence College and later as Director of the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. His latest operational tour was to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 as Chief of Governance in Regional Command South of ISAF.

Dr. Mirwais Balkhi is the Deputy Director General of First Political Division. He is also the Chief Editor of the CSS quarterly journal, Strategic Studies. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a member of the CSS in 2013. Dr. Balkhi holds a PhD in International Relations (with specialization in West Asian Studies) from Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India.

Prior to joining the CSS, Dr. Balkhi was a lecturer at the Law and Political Science Faculty of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). Currently he is lecturing at the International Relations Faculty of Afghanistan Institute of Higher Education (UofA).

Mr. David Vestenskov is a consultant at the Royal Danish Defence College and project coordinator on the peace and stabilization programme for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His analytical work and research have primarily focused on security developments in Central Asia and the Middle East, on which he also has published several articles and books. His current work comprises research, international networking, and project implementation in the areas of international security issues, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as well as regional peace building.

Ms. Farishta Sakhi is a former Director General of Border Affairs and Security Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan. She covered the Afghanistan-Pakistan security portfolio for three years. She has also spoken at many events on the security issues between both countries. She is also the former adjunct faculty at the political science department of American University in Kabul teaching conflict transformation. Her thesis paper was on Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict resolution pathways. She has a masters’ degree in Conflict Transformation from Eastern Mennonite University, Virginia, USA.

Mr. Athar Muhammad Javed is the Director General of Pakistan House, an independent think tank on International affairs. Previously, he served at the Canadian Council for Peace and International Security and the University of Copenhagen. His specialty includes regional security dynamics in South Asia and the Middle East. The
countries of interest are Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. His analytical and research work is widely published in international journals. His current work consists of research, strategic assessment, and project implementation, especially in the area of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE), Counter Terrorism (CT), international security collaborations and national security affairs.

**Mr. Mikkel Storm Jensen** is a major and a military analyst at RDDC, where his main areas of research are developments in the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq along with cyberwarfare’s strategic implications. Prior to this he has been working with security issues regarding the Danish contribution to ISAF and RSM in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on development of governance in Helmand Province, as well as other aspects of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan in general.

**Mr. Thomas Mandrup** is an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark, and an Extraordinary Associate Professor at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He has published articles and book chapters, and co-edited several books on issues related to African security governance and South African foreign policy. Currently he is an Editorial Advisory Board member of the Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies. He has extensive fieldwork experience from, for instance, DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Sudan.

**Mr. Halimullah Kousary** is currently serving as director of research with the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) based in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research practice covers security and terrorism issues along the Durand Line and the broader region. Mr. Kousary has written extensively on local and transnational dimensions of terrorism, crime-terror nexus, regional cooperation and collaborations.

**Professor Adeel J Khan** Esquire is Adjunct Professor at NDU (Pakistan) and a visiting professor at ten Pakistani/international universities. Currently honorary consultant to the Office of the German Special Envoy on AFPAK Affairs, and a long time expert on regional issues in South/Central Asia and the Middle East. He also works as an independent researcher and as practicing lawyer. He has on several occasions been advisor to national and foreign entities, and worked as advisor for EU, Asian Development Bank and World Bank.

**Lt. Col. Hans Lundsgaard** is an army officer at the Institute for Leadership and Organisation at the Royal Danish Defence College with focus on education in leadership. He has also developed strategic leadership courses for specialized staff officers in the Danish Defence. He has served 30 years in the Danish Military as an officer, which has brought him on missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan. His latest job was as military advisor for the UN in Afghanistan.
Mr. Jeppe P. Trautner is an associate professor in War Studies at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research includes work on political-military interaction, command and co-ordination in multinational operations, and military theory. Dr. Trautner entered the Danish army in 1987 and the Reserves in 1989; he has served with the UN in Kashmir 1992-94, and headed the Department of Defence Management at the Baltic Defence College 1998-2001. He has travelled extensively in various conflict zones, and held lectures on security and defence at various universities and defence institutions.

Mr. Sayed Mahdi Munadi joined the Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan as researcher in 2013. He is currently the head of research and responsible for regional cooperation and integration in South and central Asia. Mr. Munadi holds a BA and an MA in Politics and International Relations from Kabul University. Mr. Munadi is the author of several research and analytical articles, with particular focus on Afghanistan's regional integration and which have been published in academic journals and as book chapters. Mr. Munadi is also a university lecturer currently teaching modules on Principles of International Relations and other related issues at a number of private Afghan universities in Kabul.

Mr. Jakob Brink Rasmussen is PhD fellow at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research is primarily focused on peacekeeping, doctrine development and veteran studies. His current work comprises research about NATO's local level engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina covering the period of 1995-2004.

Ms. Naheed Farid is a Lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). She has a Master’s degree in Political Management from George Washington University. From 2010, she has been a member of the Afghan Parliament, where she represents the Herat Province. Since 2010, she has also been a member of the Afghanistan Parliament’s International Affairs Committee that reviews and approves Afghanistan’s strategic relationships with various countries.

Ms. Mona Kanwal Sheikh is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). She is an expert on the Pakistani Taliban and is presently conducting research on militant Islamism in Pakistan and particularly on the recruitment and communications materials of the Pakistani Taliban. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Copenhagen. The Danish Ministry of Science has awarded her two prestigious elite research prizes (2007, 2012) for her work on the Pakistani Taliban.

Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College. He is a former head of the Department of Conflict and Security Studies and director of the Defence and Security Studies Research Programme
Dr. Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies at University of Bradford. Prior to this, he was a Research Fellow at Warwick University and Oxford University and has also taught at Oxford and Sussex University. He was a British Academy Doctoral Scholar at St Antony’s College, Oxford University. He is the author of *The War and Terror and Pakistan*, Christopher Hurst and Co, London, 2011 and *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937-58*, Sage, New Delhi, 1995.

Dr. William Maley is Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University. He is a Member of the Order of Australia (AM), and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (FASSA). He is author of *Rescuing Afghanistan* (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), and *The Afghanistan Wars* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 2009).

Annemarie Peen Rodt is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College. Her research appraises Protection of Civilians (POC), Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Prevention of Mass Atrocities – primarily in wider Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Ongoing EU H2020 research projects: ‘Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU Civilian Capabilities’ and ‘Improving Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention’. Recent books: *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success and Self-determination after Kosovo* with Stefan Wolff. Further collaborative initiatives include establishing the Nordic Protection Platform, participating in the Task Force on EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities and teaching for the European Security and Defence College.
**Seminar Program**

Day 1 - October 26th

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830-0900</td>
<td>Pickup from Hotel Babette to RDDC</td>
<td>RDDC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-0930</td>
<td>Registration and coffee/guests to be seated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-0940</td>
<td>Welcome Remarks by Ole Kværnø, Dean, Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0940-0950</td>
<td>Opening remarks by Dr. Mirwais Balkhi, Afghan Head of Delegation and Deputy DG, MFA, Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Guest Speaker</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0950-0955</td>
<td>Introductory remarks by moderator</td>
<td>David Vestenskov, Consultant at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0955-1015</td>
<td>Afghanistan Perspective on Current Security Challenges in the Sub-Region</td>
<td>Freshta Sakhi, Professor, American University of Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1015-1035</td>
<td>&quot;Doing More Together&quot;: Stabilizing Afghanistan and beyond</td>
<td>Athar Javed, Executive Director, Pakistan House</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1035-1055</td>
<td>Danish perception of the regional security dynamics</td>
<td>Mikkel Storm Jensen, Major at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1055-1115</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee break</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1115-1150</td>
<td>Interactive Session</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1150-1200</td>
<td>Remarks and comments by Moderator</td>
<td>David Vestenskov, Consultant at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Luncheon – RDDC</td>
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## Session II

### Challenges and Opportunities to Internal Stability: Capacities and Internal Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Guest Speaker</th>
<th>Country</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1300-1310</td>
<td>Introductory remarks by moderator</td>
<td>Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1310-1330</td>
<td>Sustainability of ANSF on the battlefield - where we stand and what are the limitations and challenges</td>
<td>Halimullah Kousary, Head of Research, CAPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1350</td>
<td>Security Dynamics in Pakistan and an overview of the Challenges and Opportunities to Internal Stability</td>
<td>Adeel Khan, Professor and Advisor to National and Foreign Entities in Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350-1410</td>
<td>Danish Perspective: Capacity building of Afghan National Security Forces – Innovation and progress through holistic leadership education</td>
<td>Hans Lundsgaard, Lt. Col. at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410-1445</td>
<td>Interactive Session</td>
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<tr>
<td>1445-1455</td>
<td>Concluding remarks by moderator</td>
<td>Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500-1530</td>
<td>Pickup from RDDC to Hotel Babette</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830-1900</td>
<td>Pickup from Hotel Babette for Formal Dinner</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900-2200</td>
<td>Formal Dinner at Langelinie Pavillonen Address: Langelinie 10, 2100 København Ø</td>
<td>Dinner speaker: Author and journalist Carsten Jensen</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200-2230</td>
<td>Pickup from Formal Dinner to Hotel Babette</td>
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## Day 2 - October 27th

### Session III

#### Promoting Mutual Trust Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Guest Speaker</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0830-0900</td>
<td>Pickup from Hotel Babette to RDDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900-0915</td>
<td>Registration and coffee/ Guests to be seated</td>
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<tr>
<td>0915-0920</td>
<td>Introductory remarks by moderator</td>
<td>Jeppe Plenge Trautner, Associate Professor at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0920-0940</td>
<td>The Role of Economic Initiatives in AF-Pak Trust building</td>
<td>Sayed Mahdi Munadi, Head of Research, CSS, MFA.</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0940-1000</td>
<td>Historical lessons of mutual trust building: Introducing the “Understand to prevent” model (U2P)</td>
<td>Jakob Brink Rasmussen, PhD fellow RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1020</td>
<td>Changing the Narrative in Afghanistan Foreign Policy and the Role of Pakistan</td>
<td>Naheed Farid, MP and Professor, American University of Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1020-1040</td>
<td>Guardians of God</td>
<td>Mona Kanwal Sheikh, Senior Researcher at DIIS</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1040-1105</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee break</td>
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<tr>
<td>1105-1150</td>
<td>Interactive Session</td>
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<tr>
<td>1150-1200</td>
<td>Concluding remarks by moderator</td>
<td>Jeppe Plenge Trautner, Associate Professor at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Luncheon – RDDC</td>
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# Session IV

“Regional Stability & Peacebuilding Initiating Reconciliation Between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond”

## Book Launch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Guest Speaker</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1300-1310</td>
<td>Introductory remarks by Moderator</td>
<td>Moderator: Ole Kværnø, Dean RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1310-1320</td>
<td>Remarks by Editor</td>
<td>David Vestenskov, Consultant at RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1320-1335</td>
<td>Why the United States will stay engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan beyond 2017</td>
<td>Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate Professor at the Institute of Strategy, RDDC</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335-1350</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India: Opportunities for Peace and Conflict</td>
<td>Yunas Samad, Professor at University of Bradford</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350-1405</td>
<td>Sovereignty, State Capacity, and Regional Relations: Challenges of Peace building in Central Asia</td>
<td>William Maley, Professor at the Australian National University</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1405-1430</td>
<td>Interactive Session</td>
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<tr>
<td>1430-1435</td>
<td>Concluding remarks by moderator</td>
<td>Ole Kværnø, Dean RDDC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1435-1505</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee break</td>
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## Wrap-up & Closing Session

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Hrs)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1505-1515</td>
<td>Concluding remarks and way ahead by project coordinator David Vestenskov</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>RDDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1515-1525</td>
<td>Closing remarks by Dr. Mirwais Balkhi, Afghan Head of Delegation and Deputy DG, MFA, Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1525-1535</td>
<td>Closing Remarks by Ole Kværnø, Dean, Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1535-1610</td>
<td>Light Refreshment</td>
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<tr>
<td>1610-1640</td>
<td>Pickup from RDDC to Hotel Babette</td>
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This report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Report and policy recommendations based on the seminar:
“Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond” organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016.

By David Vestenskov